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I. INTRODU<::TION 
"Ohio has no legislative history." Have you heard someone say this recently? 
Perhaps another attorney, a law student, or even a lobbyist or legislator? 
Perhaps you have said it yourself, sagely and confidently? If you are so sure, 
1 B.S., The Ohio State University; M.A., The University of Chicago; J.D., 1998, The 
Ohio State University College of Law. I am particularly grateful to Professor James J. 
Brudney of the Ohio State University College of Law for encouraging me to write about 
the creation and use oflegislative history in Ohio, and for his comments and suggestions 
on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Nancy Rapoport, DennisPapp, Tatia Gibbons, 
Ann Thielke, and Alan Wernick for their comments. I thank the staff of Ohio Legislative 
Service Commission for their patience and cooperation as I studied Ohio legislative 
process, particularly Shelagh Baker, who provided valuable guidance and training. Any 
errors are my own. 
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how do you know? If Ohio has no legislative history, what is it that the Ohio 
Supreme Court and other Ohio courts have been using and referring to as 
legislative history in at least fifty cases since 1980? 
Why do commentators persist in the belief that there is no legislative history 
in Ohio when there are so many contrary signals? Does it have something to 
do with a limited definition of legislative history? Is there a misunderstanding 
about the link between different political cultures and the records kept within 
those cultures? Are we in the midst of a time lag before lawyers in Ohio 
recognize Ohio's particular form of legislative history? Do some lawyers have 
inside information that others do not have access to? Or are many instead 
ignoring what is both obvious and readily available? 
In this article I will explore what seems to be a prevailing formal view about 
Ohio legislative history, and the contradictory signals expressed by the Ohio 
Revised Code and the courts, particularly the Ohio Supreme Court. State 
statutes are not created in a vacuum. The state legislature has a professional 
staff. Records are made and preserved. These records include not only all 
versions of bills, but also analyses of these bills and of their impact on existing 
law. Ohio courts often cite these records and analyses in decisions. 
The true story about Ohio's legislative history was never simple, and it is 
now a story in the process of change. Telling the story is like putting together 
a puzzle, except the pieces of this puzzle won't arrive in one box. 
In Part Two, I consider the prevailing assumptions about legislative history 
in Ohio. In Part Three, I examine the reality of judicial use of legislative history 
in Ohio; Part Four describes the Ohio Legislative Service Commission and its 
non-partisan legislative staff. Part Five compares federal and Ohio legislative 
history, and argues that Ohio's legislative process and history are rooted in its 
political culture. In Part Six, I look at the accessibility of Ohio legislative history 
and the identities of the lawyers who have used Ohio legislative history in their 
arguments before courts. When I conclude, I hope to have convinced you to 
view these things through altered lenses and to consider a different possibility: 
there is legislative history in Ohio after all. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN OHIO - THE FORMAL VIEW: COMMON PERCEPTIONS 
AND CONTRADICTORY SIGNALS 
There is an assumption in recent commentaries on Ohio statutes that Ohio 
legislative history does not exist.2 A 1991law review note declares that "due to 
the lack of legislative history in Ohio, it is impossible to ascertain exactly what 
the Ohio legislators contemplated when they passed the Pattern of Corrupt 
2See, e.g., Benson A. Wolman, Separation Anxiety: Free Exercise Versus Equal 
Protection, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 453,462 (1986) (although criticizing the federal district court's 
literal reading of an Ohio statute and noting the court's reference to "the absence of any 
legislative history ... ;" the author does not challenge the court's statement regarding 
the absence of legislative history). 
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Activities Law."3 The author then refers the reader to an earlier footnote where 
he makes use of Comments in the Legislative Service Commission (LSC) 
Summary of Enactments describing the expected effect of the new law.4 Here 
the author diligently tracks down what Ohio courts have in fact referred to as 
legislative history, but he does not acknowledge it as legislative history.5 The 
author may not know the value of what he has found or he may have a different 
opinion about the identity of what he has used. Alternatively, perhaps the 
Summary of Enactments was not helpful or enlightening in this instance. 
In another recent article, a different commentator stated there is no 
legislative history in Ohio,6 and cited a 1971 case, State v. Dickinson,7 as support. 
Using Ohio's perceived lack of history as a contrast, the commentator later 
analyzed the legislative history of a closely related federal statute.S 
It is important to put the Dickinson decision in proper perspective; Dickinson 
deserves to be demystified. At issue in Dickinson was the intent of the legislature 
regarding the definition of the word "another" in the vehicular homicide 
statute.9 The Ohio Supreme Court first examined the grammatical construction 
of section 4511.181 of the Ohio Revised Code to determine if a viable unborn 
fetus was within the scope of the phrase "the death of another" in a vehicular 
homicide law. It determined that the word "another" was used by the General 
Assembly with reference to the word "person" in the first part of the sentence, 
"No person shall deliberately cause the death of another." 10 The court consulted 
section 451l.Ol(V), which defined person as "every natural person" and was in 
pari materia with section 4511.181, and then consulted Webster's Dictionary, 
which defined "natural" as existing from birth. These sources indicated that the 
3Donald Cosmo Ligorio, Note, Ohio's Pattern of Corrupt Activities Law: Ohio Revised 
Code Sections 2923.31-.36, 17 DAYTON L. REv. 279,284 n.43 (1991) (comparing Ohio law, 
federal law, and the law of other states regarding racketeering). 
4Jd. at 281, n.l2. The Summary of Enactments the author refers to is a summary of 
Legislative Service Commission analyses of bills enacted during each General Assembly 
and published by LSC. Id. Bill analyses will be described and discussed extensively later 
in this article. 
5See id. at 280,281,284, 304 n.160. 
6See Max Kravitz, Ohio's Administrative License Suspension: A Double jeopardy and 
Due Process Analysis, 29 AKRON L. REv. 123 (1996). 
7State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1971). 
BSee Kravitz supra note 6, at 159-63; see also Thomas R. Goots, Comment, "A Thug 
in Prison Cannot Shoot Your Sister": Ohio Appears Ready to Resurrect the Habitual Criminal 
Statute-Will it Withstand an Eighth Amendment Challenge? 28 AKRON L. REv. 253, 270 & 
n.121 (1995)(asserting a lack of state legislative history). 
9See Dickinson, 275 N.E.2dat600 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4511.181 (Anderson 
1990)). The vehicular homicide statute is now found in sections 2903.06-.07. 
10Jd. 
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General Assembly did not intend the word "person" to include a viable unborn 
fetus.ll 
The court then went on to make the following statement: "To substantiate 
this intent, this court will look beyond the statute. . . . Further, since no 
legislative history of statutes is maintained in Ohio, we must look to the source 
of the statute and to judicial pronouncements to determine the meaning of the 
word in question."12 There is no evidence in the lower court decisions of any 
attempt to introduce legislative history, so apparently none was rejected.13 
Interestingly, after the court remarked that no legislative history is 
maintained in Ohio, it proceeded in the next paragraph to discuss the history 
of section 4511.181 and how this history indicated that there had been little 
change in the pertinent wording of this statute since it first became law.l4 The 
court was looking at earlier versions of the homicide statute, going back in time 
to the laws of Northwest Territory, and also to the 1935 Ohio statute that created 
the additional offense of manslaughter in the second degree .IS 
One might surmise that the court was referring to another type of legislative 
history when it declared that none was maintained in Ohio. The previous 
version of a law is a type of legislative history, and this type of history is 
maintained in Ohio.l6 
Absent from Dickinson is a citation to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision one 
term earlier in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Eaton. The court in Eaton refused to rely 
upon a particular bill analysis from LSC as evidence of legislative intent in that 
instance.17 The Dickinson court does not cite Eaton as authority, and there is no 
evidence that a LSC bill analysis was offered in argument. 
llJd. 
l2Jd. 
13 See State v. Dickinson, 248 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Misc. 1969), rev' d, 263 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1970). 
l4See Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d at 600. 
l5Jd. at 601 & n.3. 
l6See DAVID M. GOLD, OHIO LEG. SERV. COMM'N, A GUIDEW LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN 
0HI03. 
I d. 
A researcher may begin the examination of a statute's legislative 
history by comparing the statute in question with its predecessor 
or successor acts. The versions of the Revised Code published by 
Anderson and Baldwin include after each section citations to earlier 
codifications and to the session laws that enacted or amended the 
section .... Until1927, the session laws did not indicate the changes 
in existing law made by each new act; to determine what they were 
the researcher must set the old and new laws side by side and 
compare them. 
17Cleveland Trust Co. v. Eaton, 256 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio 1970) (reporting that a LSC bill 
analysis was offered as evidence of legislative intent by appellee Eaton's attorneys, and 
was rejected as such by the court). See discussion infra Part III. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss1/5
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A number of clues in Dickinson suggest that the court was talking about a 
detailed legislative record of commentary on a pending bill similar to that 
generated by Congress when it stated that no legislative history was 
maintained in Ohio. It did look at past versions of statutes, and thus could not 
have meant that Ohio did not keep records of old versions of statutes. It did 
not refer to the recent Eaton decision, so it may not have been rejecting that 
particular form of history.lB 
Numerous authors have used LSC bill analyses and other LSC sources to aid 
in understanding a new development in state law. Most of these authors use 
the sources without making definitive statements about whether or not 
legislative history exists in Ohio. One author stands out by directly 
acknowledging LSC bill analyses as helpful in determining legislative intent.l9 
In 1983 and 1985, commentators demonstrated familiarity with LSC sources.20 
In 1994 and 1995, commentators referred to LSC documents for information 
about legislation.21 Several out-of-state journals have cited LSC interim 
research reports as part of nationwide surveys on broad topics.22 Law journal 
student notes make use of LSC materials to understand recent development in 
the law; some use the LSC materials to understand the legislative intent 
without explicitly acknowledging the source as legislative history.23 Others 
18Contrast this with Max Kravitz's article citing Dickinson. Perhaps Kravitz meant 
that Ohio did not have legislative history comparable in scope and scale to that of 
Congress. He may also have believed that the appropriate standard for legislative 
history was a federal standard, and Ohio and federal legislative history are not the same 
in format, scope or quantity. See generally Kravitz, supra note 6. 
19 See James Leonard, A Select Annotated Bibliography of Ohio Practice Materials, 17 OHio 
N.U.L. REv. 265,270-72 (1991) (describing the research sources in Ohio that are useful 
for determining legislative intent and including LSC bill analyses as useful sources). 
20See Charles E. Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers in the Public Sector 
in Ohio,46 OHIO ST. L.J. 639,664 & n.175 (1985) (citing an interview with a LSC research 
associate); James T. O'Reilly and Neil Gath, Structures and Conflicts: Ohio's Collective 
Bargaining Law for Public Employees, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 891,909, 918 (1983) (citing LSC bill 
analyses). 
21See Louis F. Lobenhofer, Limited Liability Entities in Ohio: A Primer on the Limited 
Liability Company and Partnership with Limited Liability, Their Substantive and Tax Aspects, 
21 OmoN.U.L. REv. 39, 102n.515 (1994);TeriG. Rasmussen, New Laws Governing Checks 
and Negotiable Instruments Under U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4: What Does it Mean to Financial 
Institutions in Ohio? 24 CAP. U.L. REv. 507, 511 n.7 (1995). 
22See Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27, 40 n.52 
(1984) (citing Ohio Legislative Service Staff Research Report No. 46 on Capital 
Punishment, 1961); Yao Apasu-Gbotsu, Survey, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the 
Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 655 (1986) (citing a Ohio 
Legislative Service Commission Summary of a part of the new criminal code, 1972). 
23 See Susan R. Bell, Comment, Ohio Gets Tough on Juvenile Crime: An Analysis of Ohio's 
1996 Amendments Concerning the Bindover of Violent Juvenile Offenders to the Adult System 
and Related Legislation, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 207, 223 n.141, 229 n.195 (1997); Julian B. Bell 
III, Comment, Ohio's Lemon Law: Ohio Joins the Rest of the Nation in Waging War Against 
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refer to LSC staff without an understanding of their role in the legislative 
process.24 Finally, a commentator recently accused the LSC Division of Code 
Revision of making an error because Ohio law was different from the law in 
most other states.25 These commentaries illustrate a lack of agreement about 
how to classify and describe what is available in Ohio. Moreover, the prevailing 
statements that are specifically directed at the existence of legislative history in 
Ohio ignore two elements actually used by courts: prior versions of bills and 
LSC bill analyses. 
Ill. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN OHIO - THE REALITY 
In the same year as the Dickinson opinion, Ohio legislators were writing into 
the General Provisions of the Ohio Revised Code some new rules of statutory 
construction. In September of 1971, the General Assembly passed section 1.49, 
which allows courts to consider legislative history among other things when 
determining legislative intent.26 The bill was passed on September 20, 1971, 
signed and approved by the governor on October 4, 1971, to be effective 
January 3, 1972. The Ohio Supreme Court decided Eaton on March 4,1970 and 
Dickinson on Nov. 24, 1971. The LSC bill analyses for each version of the bill do 
not state that the law is a response to a particular judicial decision, but do state 
the Automobile Limited Warranty, 57 U. ON. L. REv. 1015, 1029 n.97 (1989); Dominick 
Cirelli, Jr., Comment, Utilizing School Voucher Programs to Remedy School Financing 
Problems, 30 AKRON L. REv. 469,500 n.30 (1997); Kyle A. Knapp, Comment, One Cannot 
Serve Two Masters: Solving the Inherent Conflicts of Interest in Statutory Legal Counsel for 
Ohio School Boards, 26 CAP. U.L. REv. 141, 166; Matthew Devery McCormack, Comment, 
Tracking Ohio Insurance Coverage: The Genesis and Demise of Savoie, 20 DAYTON L. REv. 
293, 328 (1994); Douglas Schwartz, Comment, The Tortured Path of Ohio's Collateral Source 
Rule, 65 U. ON. L. REv. 643, 659 nn.148 & 150 (1997); Elizabeth J. Watters, Comment, 
State v. Collins: Is the Impossible Now Possible in Ohio? 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 307, 320 & n.95 
(1990). 
24See Judith Lynn Bick Rice, Note, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial 
Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055,1065 n.l19, 1071 n.171, 1072 (1985) (stating 
at one point that there is no legislative history in Ohio, then later describing LSC staff 
as drafting its own legislation and making recommendations to the members about the 
content of bills). 
25See Bruce A. Campbell, Trouble: Ohio's Non-Uniform Definitions of Accommodation 
and Accommodated Parties in Revised Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code and What 
to do About Them, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 319, 325 (1997). 
26Section 1.49 of the Ohio Revised Code regarding "ambiguous terms" reads: 
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the 
legislature, may consider among other matters: (A) the object sought 
to be attained; (B) The circumstances under which the statute was en-
acted; (C) The legislative history; (D) The common law or former 
statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects; 
(E) The consequences of a particular construction; (F) The administra-
tive construction of the statute. 
OHio REv. CODE ANN.§ 1.49 (Anderson 1990). Section 1.49 does not define "legislative 
history" and that term is not defined elsewhere in the Ohio Revised Code. 
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that the law "revised the definitions and rules of statutory construction which 
are applicable to the entire Revised Code."27 The session laws do not provide 
intent language for the statute, but section 1.49 is newly enacted law rather than 
amended law.28 
According to a historical record compiled by David Gold in 1985, Ohio courts 
have used various sources for legislative history, even prior to 1971.29 In 1841, 
the Ohio Supreme Court examined the history of a statute to determine the 
intention of the legislature, and found that history in the House and Senate 
Joumals.30 The House and Senate Journals, although providing a limited 
record, have always been respected and have been given more weight than any 
other source of legislative history, except prior versions of the statutes.31 
Gold demonstrates the courts' use of other types of sources, ranging from 
predecessor statutes, session laws which show deleted and new language,32 
the title of an act,33 headings given to a statute,34 special studies and research 
reports produced by LSC, LSC bill analyses, and the Summary of Enactments.35 
These sources are formally produced during the legislative process.36 The 
courts have occasionally cited other sources or records that are "official in 
27 See LSC Bill Analyses of H.R. 607, for H. Third Reading; Am. H.R. 607 for H. Third 
Reading and S. Judiciary; and Am. H.R. 607 for H. Third Reading, S. Judiciary and S. 
Third Reading, 109th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 1971). 
28See 1972 Ohio Laws 134. 
29 See GOLD, supra note 16, at 2. 
3D See State ex rei. Peters v. McCollister, 11 Ohio 46,56 (1841). "I am aware that every 
statute should speak for itself, and be constructed by itself; but if there be doubt as to 
its construction, resort may be had to extraneous matters, and nothing of this kind is 
more satisfactory than the journals of the body by which it was enacted." I d. 
31See GoLD supra note 16, at 7, 8. The House and Senate Journals are published each 
day that the chamber is in session. They record the procedural actions taken on bills: 
introductions, referrals to and reports by committees, floor motions, and votes. The 
Journals print the sponsors and titles of bills, but not the full texts. They do furnish the 
texts of amendments either recommended by the reporting committee, or proposed on 
the floor, with deletions indicated by strike-throughs and insertions shown by capital 
letters. According to Gold, "Reliance on the Journals for legislative history has never 
been questioned." Id. 
32Jd. at 3. 
33Jd. at 4. 
34Jd. at 5. 
35 Id. at 9. A bill analysis is written for every version of a bill introduced. The Summary 
of Enactments is published for each Assembly, and provides a synopsis of all bills 
enacted since the previous Summary. A condensed form of the analysis of the enacted 
bill in included in the Summary and is often referred to by courts as the LSC "Comment" 
or "Summary." The Summary of Enactments is now called the Digest of Enactments; the 
change took effect for the 122nd General Assembly. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, A 
GUIDEBOOK FOR OHIO LEGISLATORS 56-58 (6th ed. 1997) (hereinafter GUIDEBOOK]. 
36See Cow, supra note 16, at 10. 
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nature but not prepared under authority of the General Assembly" such as a 
uniform act or model law, the interpretation of federal law when Ohio law is 
based upon it, and laws of other states when Ohio has adopted provisions from 
that state.37 The courts have considered some "unofficial or quasi-official" 
sources, such as "statements of sponsoring legislators, bar committee reports, 
recommendations of administrative officers, and contemporaneous 
construction by the legal profession."38 
Ohio courts have increasingly used LSC bill analyses over the past two 
decades. Since the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Meeks v. Papadopulos39 in 
1980, both the supreme court and lower courts have relied on the bill analyses 
by the General Assembly's non-partisan professional legislative staff at the 
Ohio Legislative Service Commission as evidence of legislative intent and have 
described the bill analyses as legislative history.40 
The first noteworthy mention of LSC bill analyses was in 1970. Attorneys for 
the defendant in Eaton attempted to use a LSC analysis to argue about the 
intention of words used in a statute. The court expressed a preference for 
relying on the plain meaning of the text as its rule of construction when the text 
is plain and unambiguous.41 The court responded to the LSC bill analysis, 
called a "report" by the court, by stating its opinion that "a report of the LSC, 
with respect to proposed legislation, may not be used to give meaning to a 
legislative enactment other than that which is clearly expressed by the General 
37See id. at 11. 
38See id. at 12. Researchers will find the published sources are widely available. These 
are the House and Senate Journals (and the Bulletin, an index to the Journals), and the 
Summary or Digest of Enactments. In addition, LSC keeps all versions of bills introduced 
on file for four years; microfilm of older bills are kept in the LSC library, the Supreme 
Court Library, the Ohio State University (OSU) College of Law Library, and the state 
archives of the Ohio Historical Society. The microfilmed records of all version of bills 
introduced go back to the 68th General Assembly or 1886. LSC bill analyses of bills 
introduced have been microfilmed and retained since 1961 and are available at the LSC 
library, the Supreme Court Library, and the OSU College of Law library. The Supreme 
Court Library also maintains hard copies of bill analyses from 1991 to the present. An 
on-line news service called Hannah Information Systems carries the text of bills 
introduced and the bill analysis of the enacted versions of the bill. The LSC library is open 
to the public but maintained by the General Assembly primarily for the use of legislators; the 
General Assembly has not provided staff to assist other researchers. Interview with Debbie 
Tavenner, LSC Library Administrator, in Columbus, Ohio Ouly 28,1997). Notes of all 
interviews herein are on file with author. 
39Meeks v. Papadopulos, 404 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1980). 
40See William J. Heaphy, III, Judicial Use of LSC Analyses, Summaries, and Reports as 
"Legislative History," presented at a Public Practice Continuing Legal Education 
Seminar, October 18, 1996, (reporting an increase in the mention of LSC documents in 
court opinions during the period from approximately 1970 to 1996 ). Meeks was also cited 
in GOLD, supra note 16, at 9 n.26. 
41Eaton, 256 N.E.2d at 204 (Ohio 1970). 
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Assembly."42 Then, after acknowledging that the LSC report in question was 
"distributed to members of the General Assembly, to the press and to others 
interested in the proposed act" it went on to say that the LSC Comment "was 
not made a part of the record of the General Assembly and has not otherwise 
been published and is not generally available even in the best of the law 
libraries in this state."43 The Ohio Supreme Court was clearly mistrustful, but 
left open the possibility of relying upon bill analyses under different 
circumstances, such as ambiguous text. 
LSC bill analyses were mentioned in at least seven decisions between 1970 
and 1980, but the significant change in direction came in 1980.44 In Meeks, the 
court responded quite differently to the prosecuting attorney's proffer of a LSC 
bill analysis to aid in construing a recently enacted law.45 The court noted that 
disagreement between the trial and appellate courts indicated that the statute's 
language was ambiguous.46 It then noted that the legislature, in enacting 
section 1.49 of the Ohio Revised Code, had explicitly permitted courts to 
consider legislative history, in order to help it determine the intention of the 
legislature. The LSC bill analysis was described as an 
analysis of [the House Bill] during the time it was introduced, voted 
upon, and passed by the Ohio Senate and House of Representatives. 
Although this court is not bound by such analyses, we may refer to 
them when we find them helpful and objective. This legislative history 
indicates that the Commission, in analyzing the bill ... informed the 
members of the General Assembly that Sub.H.B. 201 excluded [certain] 
"public employers" from statutory coverage.47 
The court also cited Ohio common law, holding that "statutes are to be read in 
the light of attendant circumstances and conditions, and are to be construed as 
42Jd. 
43 Id. The court had relied on the House and Senate Journals of the General Assembly 
in the past, see supra note 30. Courts may refer to LSC bill analyses as reports, comments, 
or summaries. A bill analysis has a Comment subsection, and the Summary or Digest 
of Enactments contain excerpts from bill analyses of enacted bills. 
44See Heaphy, supra note 40, at 30-33 (listing cases prior to Meeks where the court 
referred to LSC documents for additional information about a statute). See, e.g., State ex 
rei. Cincinnati Bell v. Industrial Comm'n, 378 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ohio 1982); Wiliams v. 
Akron, 374 N.E.2d 1378, 1382 n.2 (Ohio 1978); State v. Lockett, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1071 
(Ohio 1976); ITI Canteen Corp. v. Porterfield, 283 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ohio 1972); Weiss v. 
Porterfield, 271 N .E.2d 792, 794 (Ohio 1971 ). In these cases the Supreme Court used LSC 
documents in its analysis but did not describe them as "legislative history." 
45See Meeks, 404 N.E.2d at 162 (Ohio 1980). 
46Jd. 
47Jd. (emphasis added). 
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they were intended to be understood when they were passed,"48 as further 
support for use of the LSC bill analysis. 
The Meeks court called attention to LSC bill analyses as legislative history in 
three different ways. First, it directly referred to a LSC bill analysis as legislative 
history. Second, it indicated that the bill analysis was helpful and objective in 
the context of construing an ambiguous statute. Third, it implied that the LSC 
bill analysis was a relevant "attendant circumstance" when it relied on case law 
to support the use of attendant circumstances surrounding the enactment of 
the statute.49 Since Meeks was decided, LSC documents have been cited in over 
45 Ohio Supreme Court cases, 93 appellate court cases, 56 unreported appellate 
court cases, and 10 miscellaneous cases, often as evidence of legislative intent 
and as "legislative history."50 
Ohio courts use LSC bill analyses to serve three principal objectives. These 
are A) to confirm and support the court's reading of the plain meaning of the 
text; B) to aid in construing ambiguities in the text by searching for the intent 
of the legislature; and C) to contribute to the court's understanding of the 
purpose of the legislation.51 I have chosen fourteen recent examples from the 
Ohio Supreme Court to illustrate how judicial reliance on LSC analyses serves 
each of these three objectives. 52 
A. Use ofLSC Bill Analyses to Confirm the Plain Meaning of the Text 
In Felton v. Felton, the question was whether a court may issue a domestic 
protection order even when the parties have already agreed to a no-harassment 
provision in a separation agreement. 53 Initially the court noted that the statute 
granting the right to ex parte hearings to issue a temporary protection order 
provided in plain language that the remedies "are in addition to, and not in lieu 
48Jd. (quoting Miller v. Fairley, 48 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1943)). 
49Meeks, 404 N.E.2d at 162. 
50 See Heaphy, supra note 40 (partial list). In addition, I conducted a boolean search 
on LEXIS, using the search terms "Legislative Service Commission," which retrieved a 
total of 213 cases through 1997, including all cases where the phrase was mentioned, for 
a total of 54 Ohio Supreme Court cases, including Eaton and its progeny, 92 appellate 
court cases, 55 unreported appellate court cases, and 10 miscellaneous cases. Search of 
Lexis, States Library, OHCTS File (Mar. 22, 1998). 
51Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 353 & n.123 (1990) (illustrating, by use of a "funnel of 
abstraction," the "hierarchy of sources" a judge could rely upon when interpreting a 
statute, beginning with text as the most authoritative source; then, going up the funnel, 
evidence of legislative intent in the legislative history; "imaginative reconstruction" of 
what the legislature would have done if it had known of the problem facing the court; 
the purpose or mischief the statute was designed to remedy; and, a search for the "best 
answer" to the problem). 
521 limited my total search to the end of 1997. Thirteen of these cases are discussed 
in the text and one is presented in a footnote. 
53 Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1997). 
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of, any other available civil or criminal remedies."54 Thus, protection orders 
were not precluded by the dissolution decree. The LSC bill analysis of the 
enacted bill stated that "[t]he General Assembly enacted the domestic violence 
statutes specifically to criminalize ... domestic violence and to authorize a 
court to issue protection orders designed to ensure the safety and protection of 
a complainant in a domestic violence case."55 The court reasoned that this 
extensive authority was intentionally granted to trial courts so that they could 
tailor protection orders for victims of domestic violence, in contrast to the 
general nature of the authority granted to courts by the dissolution decree's 
no-harassment provision.56 The protection orders also granted protective 
features not found in a dissolution decree, which the court elaborated upon in 
detaii.57 The plain language of the statute supported the courts findings, but 
the court of appeals had ruled that the protection order was superfluous when 
a no-harassment provision existed. The court used the LSC analysis for 
emphasis and support of its construction of the statute's plain language.58 
In State v. Moaning, the issue was whether the legislature intended to prohibit 
a person who had been convicted of attempted drug abuse, and not actual 
possession or use, from carrying a firearm, under the statute that prohibited 
having a weapon while under disability.59 The court looked at the statute's 
language to ascertain intent, and then decided its interpretation was consistent 
with the LSC analysis, which the court found "persuasive to the extent that it 
provide[ d) insight into the legislature's analysis when drafting the law."60 The 
court believed the LSC comment showed that the legislature intended to 
broaden the scope of the disability statute to include those individuals.61 
Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Utilities Commission of Ohio was an appeal 
by OCC of an application for a rate increase granted by PUCO to a small 
telephone company.62 One of the issues was whether the legislature actually 
54Jd. at 674. 
55 Id. (omissions in original). 
56 Id. at 675. 
57Jd. at 675-76. 
58 See Felton, 679 N.E.2d at 672, 674. 
59Statev. Moaning,666 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 1996); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §2923.13-.14 
(Anderson 1990 & Supp. 1997). 
60Moaning, 666 N.E.2d at 1116. 
61 See id. (quoting LSC bill analysis of Section 2923.13 of the Ohio Revised Code, "This 
section is similar to a former prohibition against weapons in the hands of bad risks, 
including fugitives, certain felons, drug dependent persons, alcoholics, and mental 
incompetents. The section expands upon the former law by including within the 
prohibition persons under indictment for or who have been convicted of any felony of 
violence or any drug abuse offense." (emphasis added, alteration in original). 
620ffice of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 638 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio 
1994). 
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intended to dispense with the notice and hearing requirements in the 
ratemaking process for small telephone companies, in contrast to the 
traditional ratemaking process, where ratepayers and the OCC did 
participate.63 The court held that the legislature departed from the traditional 
ratemaking process of quasi-judicial hearings and had delegated authority to 
PUCO to exempt small telephone companies entirely when it enacted section 
4927.04(B).64 This exemption made the process for these small companies 
legislative, with no opportunity for notice and hearing. The court used the LSC 
bill analysis, which confirmed the intent to dispense with notice and hearing 
for small telephone company ratemaking, to support its reading of the 
statute.65 
In Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Systems, the issue was whether the language of 
the statute of limitations regarding unpaid minimum wages could be applied 
to require that the Department of Industrial Relations bring an action on behalf 
of employees for the payment of prevailing wages within two years.66 The 
majority used the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, reasoning that 
section 2305.11(A) expressly mentioned unpaid overtime compensation and 
unpaid wages, but was silent with respect to prevailing wages. This suggested 
to the court a legislative intent to exclude the term. The court added that 
minimum wage laws and prevailing wage laws were enacted with different 
purposes in different chapters of the code.67 The concurring opinion cited an 
earlier decision, including a quote of the LSC summary of the bill, to conclude 
that any limitation periods in section 2305.11 applied only when a prevailing 
wage violation existed, and did not apply in this case.68 
State ex rei. v. Voinovich was a challenge to the constitutionality of a workers' 
compensation appropriations bill, where two of the four issues presented were 
whether the bill violated the three-consideration provision and the one-subject 
rule of the Ohio Constitution.69 The dissent argued that the original simple 
appropriations bill now contained "massive substantive law changes to the 
workers compensation system," including changes to the structure of the 
administration, limitations on the authority of the Industrial Commission, 
63 See id. at 554. 
64Jd. 
65 See id. The court also quoted from and relied on testimony on behalf of the Ohio 
Telephone Association to support its construction of the intent of the statute and PUCO' s 
regulations. I d. Records of testimony before committees are not retained in a consistent 
manner in Ohio. 
66Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Sys., 593 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio 1992). 
67Jd. at 1378;seealso0moREv.CoDEANN. §2305.1l(a)(Anderson 1990 &Supp. 1997). 
68Harris, 593 N.E.2d at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Van Hoose,550 N.E.2d 461,463 (Ohio 
1990). 
69 See State ex rei. v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994). See also Am.Sub.H.R. 107, 
120th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 1995). 
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elimination of regional boards, limitations on rights of injured workers, 
incentives for employer resistance, changes in standard of proof for tort claims, 
and privatization of the rehabilitation program?O The dissent found that the 
"magnitude of the changes by the legislation is demonstrated by the LSC 
Comparison of Current and Prior Workers' Compensation Law and Provisions 
of Am. Sub.H.B.107. It takes twenty pages to list the changes made by the bill."71 
The dissent used House and Senate Journals, as well as the LSC analysis 
contrasting existing law with proposed changes, and case law, in its argument 
that the bill was logrolling, "the practice by which several matters are 
consolidated in a single bill for the purpose of obtaining passage for proposals 
which would never achieve a majority if voted on separately,"72 and that the 
legislature was violating the one-subject rule?3 
B. Use of LSC Bill Analyses to Search for the Intent of the Legislature 
In State v. Williilms, the sole issue was whether there was sufficient evidence 
that appellee and appellant were family or household members, as defined by 
statute, in order to convict appellee of violating a domestic violence statute?4 
The court held that the offense of domestic violence arose out of the relationship 
of the parties rather than out of their living circumstances.75 The statute 
protected "family or household members," which included cohabitants, but 
"cohabitant" was not defined?6 Appellee argued that cohabitation required 
that the two had lived together. The court's reasoning began with its reference 
to a case decided earlier the same year that had cited a LSC bill analysis. That 
analysis said that "the General Assembly enacted the domestic violence statutes 
specifically to criminalize those activities commonly known as domestic 
violence .... "77 The court then looked at research studies of domestic violence 
victims, which established that the offense arose out of the relationship itself, 
and not out of the sharing of the same address?B The court reasoned that 
because the General Assembly recognized the special nature of domestic 
violence by providing special protections such as temporary protection orders, 
it clearly believed that assault on or by a family or household member deserved 
70See Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d at 601. 
71Jd. 
72 Id. at 602 (quoting Hoover v. Board of Franklin County Commissioners, 482 N .E.2d. 
575,580 (Ohio 1985) which cited the definition of logrolling in State ex ref. Dix v. Celeste, 
464 N.E.2d. 153 (Ohio 1984)). 
73 Id. at 601-02. 
74State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126,1127 (Ohio 1997). 
75Jd. at 1129. 
76See OHio REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2919.25 (Anderson 1997). 
77See Williams, 683 N.E.2d at 1128. 
78 Id. at 1128-29. 
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more protection than assault by a stranger?9 Then the court looked at case law 
for definitions of cohabitation and decided that the essential elements were 
found in the relationship, and the intimacy of the relationship, not in sharing 
the same address.BO In this case, the court went beyond the statute to define the 
scope of the relationship of those protected by the statute, using a combination 
of legislative intent to protect victims of domestic violence, studies identifying 
the victims of domestic violence, and case law defining cohabitation. 
In State ex rel. Toledo Edison v. City of Clyde, at issue was whether the Miller 
Act required the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio to review abandonment 
or closing of the Toledo Edison electric facility in Clyde, and whether the Miller 
Act protected Toledo facilities to the extent that Clyde could not serve future 
new customers with its own electric utility after Toledo's franchise expired.Bl 
The court began by stating it would review the history of the Miller Act, passed 
in 1919, which it found "susceptible of more than one interpretation."82 It 
reviewed preenactment wording changes, considered policy implications, 
considered industry meaning of certain key terms, and cited a LSC bill analysis 
of the 1978 Certified Territory Act and the language of a section of that Act, 
together with related case law, to support its holding that Clyde could control 
operation of utilities within its boundaries after the franchise expired.83 
In In reAnnexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis the issue was whether 
township trustees could appeal the approval of a landowner's petition for 
annexation.B4 This case involved an alleged conflict between statutory 
remedies provided in two different statutes. The court ultimately relied on an 
LSC bill analysis which explained that the amendment to section 505.62 was 
"only a response to this court's prior determination that township trustees 
lacked standing in an appeal from the denial of a petition for annexation. The 
amendment ... did not change the procedure for challenging the allowance of 
a landowner's petition for annexation."85 Here the court looked at bill analyses 
for different bills to sort out the intent of the legislature, and reversed the court 
of appeal's holding that the statutes allowed concurrent remedies. 
In State v. Economo, at issue was what quality of other evidence was necessary 
to satisfy the corroboration requirement of the sexual imposition statute, which 
79 Id. at 1129. 
80Jd. at 1130. 
81State ex rei. Toledo Edison Co. v. City of Clyde, 668 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio 1996). 
82Jd. at 504. 
83See id. at 506. 
84Jn reAnnexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis, 597 N.E.2d 460 (Ohio 1992). 
85See id. at 462 (quoting from LSC Bill Analysis of amendment to OHIO REv. CoDE 
§ 505.62 which reported the Ohio Supreme Court ruling in In re Appeal of Bass Lake 
Community, 449 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio 1983), that boards of township trustees lacked 
standing in an appeal of a denial of an annexation petition .... The bill should confirm 
standing .... ) (omissions added). 
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only required that "no person shall be convicted of a violation of this section 
solely upon the victim's testimony unsupported by other evidence."86 The 
court ignored the justification provided for the corroboration rule in the LSC 
analysis, which stated the rule was justified because of the ease with which this 
crime may be abused in prosecution, and instead decided to leave to trial courts 
the responsibility of ensuring that convictions for sexual imposition are based 
on sufficient evidence.87 The prosecution had used the bill analysis as part of 
its argument to abolish the corroboration requirement as unwise intent on the 
part of the legislature, and the defendant had used the same analysis to support 
its case for the requirement of more evidence. The court did not abolish the 
requirement as requested by the prosecution, but did not require more evidence 
as requested by the defendant. It used the LSC analysis as grist for its attack on 
the legislature's differential treatment of the victims of this type of crime.88 
Implicit in this attack on the legislature was an assumption that the bill analysis 
reflected the legislative intent to keep the corroboration requirement.89 
C. Use of LSC Bill Analyses to Understand the Purpose of the Legislation 
In Zalud Oldsmobile Pontiac, Inc. v. Tracy, an appeal from the Board of Tax 
Appeals, one issue was whether a section of the Ohio tax code violated the 
federal Equal Protection Clause by treating taxpayers differently without a 
rational basis.90 The court held that the General Assembly intended to adjust 
certain depreciation expenses in response to federal tax changes in order to 
maintain constant tax revenues and return windfalls to the taxpayer. The court 
began its analysis of the statute with the LSC bill analysis of an earlier bill, 
which explained the interaction of the Federal Economic Recovery Act of 1981 
with Ohio tax law and the intent of the Ohio bill to change computation of 
corporate net income in specific years only, and also cited The Journal of State 
Taxation, before it arrived at its conclusion that the legislature had a legitimate 
purpose to keep revenues level and a rational basis to sustain that purpose.91 
In State v. Lovejoy, the issue was "whether the doctrines of double jeopardy 
and collateral estoppel apply when a jury finds a defendant not guilty as to 
some counts and is hung as to other counts."92 The court held that the doctrines 
did not apply when the inconsistency arose out of responses to different counts. 
86State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1996) (quoting OHIO REv. CODE 
§ 2907.06(8)). 
87Jd. at 230. 
88The court adopted Judge Nugent's dissent to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga 
County decision. See State v. Economo, No. 66408, 1994 WL 693485, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 
8th Dist. Dec. 8, 1994). 
89See Economo, 666 N.E.2d at 229. 
90zalud Oldsmobile Pontiac, Inc. v. Tracy, 671 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 1996). 
91See id. 
92State v. Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (Ohio 1997). 
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The dissent argued that the doctrine of double jeopardy did apply, because the 
separate offenses shared common issues. The dissent relied primarily on case 
law, but also cited a LSC bill analysis of the robbery statute that stated "the 
offense can be a lesser included offense to both forms of aggravated murder" 
as part of its argument that both counts involved the same victim, conduct, and 
proof.93 
In State v. Smith, a death penalty appeal, the court rejected the defendant's 
double jeopardy argument in favor of a single prison sentence for two counts 
of aggravated robbery.94 The court stated that injury as an element of 
aggravated robbery was inflicted on separate victims, and thus the offenses 
were separate. The reasoning was supported by a LSC analysis of the 
aggravated robbery statute. The Comment section of the bill analysis stated 
that "[A] thief who ... steals different property from three separate victims ... 
can be charged with and convicted of all three thefts."95 
State v. Awkal was another death penalty appeai.96 The defendant argued 
that the shooting was spur of the moment and thus an impulse murder, raising 
the issue of whether length of time pondering the crime determined whether 
he acted with prior calculation and design.97 The court cited a LSC bill analysis 
from State v. D' Ambrosio.9B The LSC Comment defined prior calculation and 
design to require "a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to 
kill. ... neither the degree of care nor the length of time the offender takes to 
ponder the crime beforehand are critical factors in themselves ... momentary 
deliberation is insufficient."99 The court supported its decision that there was 
sufficient evidence the accused acted with prior calculation with the bill 
analysis explaining the statute.lOO 
As these cases strongly suggest, Ohio courts generally have not used 
legislative history to override the plain meaning of the text. Section 1.49 of the 
Ohio Revised Code permits courts to rely on extrinsic sources only to resolve 
ambiguities in the text. Eaton remains good law because LSC analyses, or any 
extrinsic source, may not be used to override the plain meaning of text. The 
93See id. at 1125. 
94State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio 1997). 
95 See id. at 694. 
96State v. Awkal, 667 N.E.2d 960 (Ohio 1996). 
97 Id. at 967. 
98State v. D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 918 (Ohio 1993) (quoting State v. Cotton, 381 
N.E.2d 190, 193 (1978)). . 
99Jd. 
100See Citizens Ins. Co. of New Jersey v. Burkes, 381 N.E.2d at 967 (citing the LSC 
Comment to OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2903.01). See also D'Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d at 918, 
for another instance where the court used this LSC comment to define the requirements 
of a "scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill." Id. 
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danger is in reading Eaton as forbidding the use of LSC analysis to aid in any 
statutory interpretation.lOl 
The record described by Gold demonstrates that there is and has been some 
type of legislative history maintained in Ohio and relied on by courts in Ohio 
since the mid-19th century. Even though many commentators assume that 
legislative history does not exist in Ohio, the Ohio Revised Code tells the courts 
they may rely on legislative history when construing an ambiguous statute. 
Based on the Ohio Revised Code, I conclude that legislative history in fact exists 
in Ohio and that Ohio courts have been using a particular type of source over 
the past seventeen years and calling it legislative history. I intend to explore 
possible reasons for these contradictions later, after describing Ohio's 
legislative process and particularly the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, 
the source of the documents relied upon by Ohio courts.102 
IV. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION 
The Legislative Service Commission is a state agency created by statute in 
1953 to provide technical and research services to the members of the General 
Assembly.103 It is part of the legislative branch of Ohio government. "LSC staff 
are non-partisan researchers and bill drafters who play a supporting role in the 
legislative process" and are maintained "solely to give members of the General 
Assembly access to the technical assistance and research capabilities that will 
enable them to perform their duties efficiently and effectively."104 
The "Commission" itself is composed of fifteen members: seven legislators 
from the House, seven from the Senate, and a non-legislator Director of LSC 
staff who is employed by the legislator members. The members include the 
President of the Senate and six additional senators appointed by the President, 
the Speaker of the House, and six additional representatives appointed by the 
Speaker. In order to assure minority party representation, the statute provides 
that no more than four of the six appointed members of each house may come 
from the same party.105 The Commission maintains the staff "solely to give 
members of. the General Assembly access to the technical assistance and 
101Butsee850.Jur.3d, Statutes§§ 188,216 (1988&Supp. 1997), foranexampleofwhat 
I believe is a misuse of both Eaton and Dickinson; Meeks is entirely absent from Section 
188 on legislative history and Section 216 on the use of reports of committees or 
commissions. 
102The use of the House and Senate Journals is outside the scope of this paper; I am 
focusing instead on the court's use of LSC documents as legislative history. 
103See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 86; see also OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§§ 103.11-13 
(Anderson 1990) for creation of LSC, its powers and duties. 
104Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, to Members of the Ohio General 
Assembly and LSC Staff, on the role of LSC Staff (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter 
Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director] (on file at LSC, to be incorporated into 
Staff Manual). 
105GuiDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 86-87. 
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research capabilities that will enable them to perform their duties efficiently 
and effectively."106 LSC staff work with and complement House and Senate 
caucus staff)07 
A. History of LSC 
LSC was established in 1953 as part of a consolidation of governmental 
research services under one single agency)OS The Commission of Code 
Revision, formed in 1945 to codify and revise state law, recommended in its 
final report that a permanent non-political research authority be established to 
conduct research to draft legislative proposals during the interim between 
sessions.l09 The Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB), formed earlier, retained 
its responsibilities for bill and resolution drafting. LSC's primary duties 
included legislative study committees and long term research reports,llO 
short-term research on any subject, codification of the law of the state, and 
impartial information and reports.111 
In 1965, LSC began to accept individual member requests for bill drafts, 
install computerized bill typing systems, and emphasize session-related 
services. It also began, upon request, to provide staff for standing committees 
of the House and Senate in the next session.112 
The 1966 elections, the first under the one-person one-vote single-member 
district system, brought in a large number of freshman legislators)13 
Thereafter, the General Assembly, acting through the legislative leadership of 
106See Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, supra note 104. 
107See id. See also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 84 (describing partisan personal and 
caucus staff services; the House and Senate each have a majority and minority party 
caucus). 
108See DAVID A. JOHNS1DN, THE 0IDO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION-A 
NoN-PoLmCAL PoLmCAL INSTITUTION 2 (1986) (reporting that The Ohio Program 
Commission, the Legislative Research Commission and the Bureau [sic] of Code 
Revision were merged into LSC) (on file with LSC). 
109 See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF CODE REVISION 22 (House Journal, July 1, 
1953). 
110See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 87-88. Legislative study committees are a type of 
long-term research approved by the Commission and undertaken by a special 
committee of legislators. Other long-term research is done by LSC staff members either 
after approval by the Commission, or upon requirement by specific legislation. 
111See JOHNS1DN, supra note 108, at 2. 
112See id. at 14-15 Oohnston was not specific as to who asked the Commission to 
provide staff for committees, but all LSC staff work is in response to the General 
Assembly acting through the Commission). 
113 See Thomas A. Flinn, The Ohio General Assembly: A Developmental Analysis, in STATE 
LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION 233 Games A. Robinson ed., 1973) and Samuel C. Patterson, 
Legislative Politics in Ohio, in Omo POLmcs 238 (Alexander P. Lamis ed., 1994). 
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the Commission, asked LSC staff to be present at every committee meeting.114 
In 1967, the General Assembly moved toward an annual session approach. 
Annual sessions changed the focus of LSC staff. With no interim, in-depth 
interim studies faded away as demands for immediate staff work became more 
frequent.llS 
Staff size had increased in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s because 
committee chairpersons "did not want staff assigned to their committees 
doubling up on some other committee."116 Committees increased in number 
as well, from 24 in 1967, to 38 in 1985. Staff at LSC increased from 34 in 1966 
(including 20 professionals plus clerical staff) to 121 in 1985; LSC began with a 
staff of 7 in 1953.117 LSC employs a staff of over 100 today, including about 60 
professionals with either law or other advanced degrees. 
In 1981, during a low point in state finances, the General Assembly abolished 
the Legislative Reference Bureau. The legislature gave LSC the bill and 
resolution drafting duties formerly assigned to the bureau. In doing so, it saved 
money by eliminating the salary of the LRB director and one attomey.118 Prior 
to its elimination in 1981, the LRB had primary responsibility for bill drafting, 
while LSC had primary responsibility for long-term studies, and did some bill 
drafting. In addition, LSC would prepare, upon legislator request, 
implementing legislation that resulted from its own studies, and legislation for 
special sessions.119 In 1965, the Commission decided to accept individual 
member requests without taking formal action. "That session, LSC staff drafted 
about 800 bills. Meanwhile, the LRB was drafting 1300 bills."120 
In 1967 LSC placed into operation a computerized version of the code and 
bill preparation system, which increased the capacity to produce bills tenfold 
from 400 in 1963, to 4100 in a single session. David Johnston, primary chronicler 
of LSC history, does not believe the computerized bill typing was the only 
explanation for LSC's vast increase in the number of bills produced. He believes 
the continued presence and support of LSC staff in committees was another 
factor.121 According to Johnston, "members stopped drafting their own bills; 
many lobbyists and state agency officials asked for bills as concepts rather than 
handing legislators completely drafted bills to introduce; and legislators who 
114See JoHNSTON, supra note 108. 
115See id. at 15. 
l16Jd. at 15-16. 
117Jd. 
118[d. at 18. Frugality will emerge often as a prominent value in Ohio. 
119JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 31. 
120 ld. at 34. 
121Jd. at 35. "Computerized bill typing permitted a great increase in substitute bills 
but the increases cannot be explained through that one factor. Indeed in the most recent 
sessions when the total number of substitute bills went up, Commission drafting loads 
went down." ld. 
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received drafted bills from agencies and interest groups for introduction asked 
LSC to go over them and redraft them as needed. These developments were 
furthered by House and Senate rules that required all bills introduced to be 
approved by the LSC or the LRB for form."122 
The elimination of LRB meant that all bill drafting was done by LSC, by 
drafters who sat in on and worked for the committees that heard the bills they 
drafted, allowing them to hear the questions and concerns raised concerning 
these bills.123 This is still the practice today.124 
B. Bill Analyses 
From its earliest days, members asked LSC to analyze certain bills and 
explain their content because of the "combinations of complex language, 
specialized word usage, and the broader legal context of bills .... "125 The 
practice evolved gradually. First, the Senate President pro tern during the 
mid-1950s asked for analyses of the bills considered by the Senate Rules 
Committee. The analysis would explain how the bill changed the law, the 
purpose of the bill, and how the bill would deal with the problem. Then all 
Rules Committee members requested bill analyses.126 
In 1961, senators asked LSC to provide the analyses requested by the Rules 
Committee to all the senators before a vote on a bill in any floor session.127 By 
1961, staff was providing bill analyses upon request, but not routinely, for the 
House as well as the Senate; legislator feedback confirmed the value of this 
service.128 
LSC began to provide analyses to the House on a routine basis in 1967, rather 
than just by request, in response to a 1966 study of legislative services, where 
more than half of the House members indicated they wanted bill analyses. 
When staff were provided for each standing committee, chairs were given the 
option of having analyses done for their committees; all but House Judiciary 
wanted them. Since the beginning of the 1967 session, LSC has prepared bill 
analyses for both committee and floor use in both houses)29 
122Jd. at 35-36. 
123 Id. at 37. 
124See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 86-92. 
125JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 41. 
126Jd. at 42. 
127Jd. at 43. 
128See Minutes from the Ohio Legislative Service Commission (February 27, 1961) 
(recording a report by the Director that "the staff was doing bill analyses for the House 
as well as the Senate this Session" and that "it was the consensus that this is one of the 
most valuable services the staff can render during legislative sessions.") (on file with 
LSC). 
129JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 43. 
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C. LSC Staf!Today 
Ohio's original approach to legislative staffing was different from other 
states, and it still is. More typical is division by function with separate agencies 
dedicated to drafting, code revision, research, library, and fiscal review.130 LSC 
is a centralized staff agency; each professional staff member performs research, 
bill drafting, bill analysis, and committee staffing. Organization is by subject 
matter groups based on the committee structure of the legislature.131 
The members of the General Assembly in Ohio have their own small partisan 
staff.132 Ohio employs a smaller total partisan and non-partisan legislative staff 
when compared to nearby states that have comparable population and also 
have full-time legislatures.133 
At least one LSC staff person is assigned to each standing committee and 
subcommittee of the House and Senate.134 That person attends all committee 
meetings, so he or she is able to listen to testimony and debate, and become 
acquainted with the members of the committee. Bill drafting is done in this 
context of an ongoing relationship.l35 When a legislator wants to draft 
legislation, he discusses his ideas with LSC staff or gives drafts to LSC to review, 
and the LSC staff works with the legislator to put the ideas into language.136 
130Telephone Interview with Brian Weberg, Principal Staff Associate in the 
Legislative Management Program, National Conference of State Legislatures Ouly 28, 
1997). 
131 JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 47-48. 
132See Patterson, Legislative Politics in Ohio, supra note 113, at 255. "For a legislature in 
an urban, industrial state, the Ohio House and Senate operate with relatively lean staffs." 
Id. See also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 84-86 (listing the caucus and personal staff 
available). "Caucus and personal staff include caucus aides, legislative aides, 
administrative aides, secretaries, legislative interns, and pages." I d. Both chambers have 
a minority and majority party caucus. "The majority party in each house normally 
controls how funds appropriated for the operation of the particular house are allocated 
... including the number of staff available to members." Id. See, e.g., the telephone listing 
of the House staff for the 122nd General Assembly. Each Republican representative has 
an administrative assistant and a legislative assistant. Each Democrat has one assistant 
listed. The Senate's telephone listing lists almost twice as many Republican aides 
(twenty-nine) as Democratic aides (sixteen). 
133Telephone interview with Brian Weberg, supra note 130. Pennsylvania and New 
York, for example, have central agencies, but they are more removed from the legislative 
process; total staff in New York is 5000 and in Pennsylvania 2700. Most of these are 
partisan staff. Ohio, in contrast, is considered to be a large state with a full time 
legislature that "reins in size of staff," according to Weberg. Staff size in Ohio is under 
500. Id. 
134See GUIDEBOOK supra note 35, at 87. 
135See id. at 90-92. 
136See id. at 46, section titled "From Idea to Bill." 
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LSC staff do not make or advocate policy; they listen to the members and 
help them put their policy intention into words.137 The members also listen to 
lobbyists and to their party caucus.138 LSC staff are answerable only to the 
members, not to the lobbyists, when drafting a bill, unless and only if instructed 
by the member to work with the lobbyist.139 The LSC staff are agents of the 
institution, the General Assembly, because they serve at the pleasure of the 
General Assembly.140 However, when drafting a bill, they act as the agent of 
the individual member. Their role depends upon their ability to be trusted as 
neutral and non-partisan. "Non-partisan" in Ohio means researching and 
teaching, providing information, and laying out options, rather than 
advocating one position over another. It means putting political intentions into 
technical language, because technical revisions do not involve taking sides.l41 
The members can tum to lobbyists or members of their party for political 
instruction, but they tum to LSC for technical assistance in research, drafting, 
factual interpretation of the meaning of words, how a bill fits into current law 
and how it will change current law.142 Thus, the legislators use different sources 
for technical and for political information. The assistance of non-partisan staff 
does not deprive legislators of political staff or make the legislative process 
non-political; instead, it makes the acquisition of facts non-political.143 
137See id. 
138See Patterson, Legislative Politics in Ohio, supra note 113, at 24, "party caucuses are 
the routine site for discussing and hashing out party stands, for the exchange of 
information between leaders and backbenchers .... ,"and at 256 n.28 (citing Barbara 
Bolt Lewis, Ohio Lobbying 1992 (Ph.D. dissertation Ohio State University), "lobbying 
by interest groups is very much in evidence in the capital," but the leadership" constrains 
and channels interest group influence." 
139See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 90-92 (describing lobbyist drafting as an 
occasional, not regular, occurrence). 
140See Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, supra note 104. 
14lfor a discussion of non-partisan staff in Congress, as well as a comparison of 
partisan and non-partisan staff in general, see MICHAEL MALBIN, UNELECTED 
REPRESENTATIVES 170, 172, 177, 184, 186 (1980) (describing the non-partisan staff who 
served the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation from 1964-1976 and 1977 -78). 
Id. at 187-201, (describing a different kind of "non-partisan staff that has policy 
preferences, operates from certain assumptions and makes policy recommendations 
based on those assumptions"); see id. at 202, (explaining that when staff use debatable 
assumptions to make judgments that have policy implications, it is more difficult to 
maintain a non-partisan posture). LSC staff avoid policy recommendations. See 
Memorandum from Bob Shapiro, LSC Director, supra note 104. 
142Interview with Bill Heaphy, Research Attorney, LSC, in Columbus, Ohio Ouly 17, 
1997). 
143See MALBIN, supra note 141, at 242-43 (commenting on the advantages of dual staff). 
"If every committee [in Congress] had a nonpartisan professional staff core, there would 
be fewer occasions on which Congress would receive intentionally partial or distorted 
information from its staff ... Let every committee have a dual staff .... "); see also 
JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 8, 64 where he attributes the acceptance of LSC to both the 
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Once a bill is drafted, and before the first committee hearing, the LSC staff 
person writes a bill analysis, which is distributed to committee members while 
the bill is in committee, updated to reflect amendments made while in 
committee, and distributed to everyone else when it leaves committee to be 
voted on in the House or Senate. When the bill moves to the second chamber, 
another LSC staff person, assigned to the committee in that chamber, reads the 
bill and writes another bill analysis, which may be different. The staffer in the 
second chamber will always give the bill a fresh look even if there are no 
changes, and at minimum write a new bill analysis with new title and history. 
The staffer in the second chamber is usually responsible for the final bill 
analysis after a bill is enacted, so the person who writes that final analysis is 
not the same person who helped draft the bill. Occasionally, with long complex 
bills, the analysis is a cooperative effort by more than one staff member.l44 The 
bill analysis will focus solely on the text as it is and what that text means, how 
it affects existing law, and what the repercussions of that particular text will 
be.l45 It is usually more than a mere restatement of what the bill says.146 
The process of preparing bill analyses is less interactive than actual bill 
drafting. When bills are drafted, regular dialogue occurs between the sponsor 
and LSC. It is the sponsor who has the final word about what the bill as 
introduced will say. Political considerations will be a factor. The LSC staffer is 
there to help implement those choices in drafting, but the legislator is the 
lawmaker. By contrast, LSC staff preparing bill analyses work on their own 
with review by their division chiefs. If it is obvious that what the text says is 
not what the sponsor intended, the staffer will call the sponsor to tell him or 
her about the problem and what the bill analysis will say. The bill analysis of 
that version does not change, however. The function of the bill analysis is to 
tell the member what the text as written at that point will do, not what the 
member wants the bill to do, something that has already been discussed 
between LSC and the legislator. For various reasons, language planned by the 
service it provides and its coexistence with partisan caucus staff. 
144When the bill moves to the second chamber, usually another LSC staff person 
writes an analysis, and each staff person's work is reviewed by a division chief and later 
by the Director. Telephone Interview with Dennis Papp, LSC Research Attorney (March 
4, 1998). 
145See LSC STAFF MANUAL, Bill Analysis, 8 (warning of the pitfalls of believing a bill 
"does or does only what its stated intent is." Instructing that sometimes a bill does not 
do what it is intended to do; or "it does what it is intended and has other significant 
implications.'") 
146See id. at 4-5 (for instructions about how to write a bill analysis). A bill analysis 
should not be just a "bland regurgitation of the bill's contents ... "or "merely recite the 
things the bill does in the order in which the bill does them." The bill analysis 
"[f]requently ... must go beyond the language of the bill to an explanation of present 
law or a discussion of a given situation in order to provide adequate understanding of 
what a bill does or attempts to do." Id. But see MELANIE K. PU1NAM & SusAN M. 
SCHAEFGEN, OHIO LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 96 (1997). "The purpose of the bill analyses is 
to summarize the bill for the legislator." 
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legislator can result in unintended consequences, and the point of the analysis 
is to help the legislator ultimately end up with text that is likely to accomplish 
his purpose. Thus, if there is a problem with the bill, the legislator and LSC staff 
may write an amended version. Different bill analyses for each version 
highlight and analyze the effect of even small changes in the text, and also 
highlight the intent to make those changes.147 
Because a new bill analysis is written for each version of a bill, members can 
compare versions for changes and for the implications of the changes.l48 A 
different type of bill analysis, called the synopsis, is particularly useful for 
comparing the effects of substitute bills, amendments, and conference 
committee recommendations.l49 Legislators rely on their partisan and 
non-partisan sources in different ways: they rely on the LSC bill analysis to 
understand the content of a bill, and on their party caucus for their political 
and policy decision-making)SO 
There is empirical support for the proposition that both legislators and staff 
read and rely upon bill analyses)Sl A recent Document Survey conducted by 
LSC of legislators and staff asked how often bill analyses were used to 1) learn 
the details of a bill; 2) obtain an overview of a bill; 3) learn how a bill affects 
existing law; 4) find the location of a specific provision in a bill; and, 5) find out 
if a bill has potential problems. Of 144 responding, 135 replied that they 
frequently used bill analyses to get an overview of a bill; 119 replied that they 
frequently used bill analyses to learn the details of the bill; 72 replied that they 
frequently used bill analyses to learn how a bill affects existing law; and 43 
replied that they frequently used bill analyses to find out if a bill has potential 
problems.l52 Individual comments from legislators included, "I am extremely 
147Interview with Dennis Papp, LSC Research Attorney, in Columbus, Ohio 
(September 18, 1997); interview with Shelagh Baker, LSC Division Chief, in Columbus, 
Ohio (September 11, 1997). 
148Telephone interview with Dennis Papp, supra note 144. 
149Interview with Bill Heaphy, supra note 142, (relating that, in his experience, 
legislators use comparative synopsis to make sure something has not been "slipped in.") 
Synopses are required by House Rules 36 and 63. 
l50See id. 
l5lSee LSC STAFF MANUAL, supra note 145, at 13 (emphasizing the continuing 
importance of bill analysis for legislators, and thus the importance of LSC staff effort in 
this area.) 
l52See Report to the Director, Document Review Committee Survey of Legislators and 
Staff (Oct. 1996) (on file at LSC). The committee mailed surveys to 340 legislators and 
staff, including aides, caucus staff, and administrative assistants of House members who 
did not have legislative aides. They received responses from 27 Representatives, 6 
Senators, 65 House staffers, and 46 Senate staffers, for a total of 144 responses. 
Respondents were given three choices of response: frequently, sometimes, and rarely. 
The committee was established to "review and critique the major documents the LSC 
staff prepares for the General Assembly" and questioned members and their staff to 
determine usefulness of and solicit suggestions for the improvement of bill analyses, 
comparative synopses, the digest of enactments, and other documents. I d. I am limiting 
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dependent upon them;" "It is always helpful to have a section boiled down, 
[sic] essential thrust of the main operation of the bill."153 Individual comments 
from staff included, "All analysis [sic] are helpful because it is much more 
difficult to read the actual bill;" "There is hardly a day that goes by that I do not 
use a bill analysis for one reason or another. Sometimes it is for bringing myself 
up to speed on an issue or for giving a constituent an easy-to-understand 
version;" "Only when an analysis has not yet been drafted do I begin the tedious 
job of reading the entire bill and preparing my own synopsis for a clearer 
understanding." 154 
The record provided by the history of LSC, the minutes of a 1961 
Commission meeting, the requests for more of this type of service over the 
passage of time, and the results of the most recent survey all indicate that bill 
analyses are a valuable resource for legislators. Given that legislators and their 
personal aides read bill analyses for both an overview and the details of a bill, 
the bill analysis appears to be something on which the legislators rely upon 
before they vote. That reliance comes close to representing something about 
the shared intent of the legislature, which is a key factor in legislative history 
reliability for courts according to commentators who write about federal 
legislative history.155 If the majority of legislators do read bill analyses before 
voting, then that practice gives insights into what assumptions were made by 
legislators about how their words would be understood and the setting in 
my discussion to the results of questions about bill analyses. According to the chairman 
of the Document Review Committee, everyone who responded to the questionnaire 
filled out the multiple choice portion. The responses to the multiple choice questions 
followed a strong pattern. The committee did not break down the results to distinguish 
between staff and legislator response. Not all respondents provided individual 
comments, though, so the committee found the breakdown of comments between 
members and staff to be more interesting and useful. Telephone interview with Jim 
Kelly, LSC Research Associate Oune 3, 1998). 
153See generally Report to the Director, supra note 152 (These comments from 
legislators and from staff were in response to LSC requests for suggestions for 
improvement); see also LSC Staff Memo, Document Review Committee Adopted 
Recommendations, January 8, 1997, ("dramatic fundamental changes to LSC documents 
were not warranted but the documents could be made more useful to legislators and 
their staff .... All in all, the revisions are changes in packaging, rather than content.") 
154Report to the Director, supra note 152. 
155See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of 
Statutes; Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 7 4-75 (1994)( describing how 
members of Congress examine and rely upon a committee report for information about 
a bill's content and its expected consequences before they vote, because the committee 
has been given responsibility for drafting the text and explaining its meaning, ... "not 
because each member has agreed to it in the way a member 'agrees to' text through a 
vote."; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 
65 S. CALL. REv. 845,863-65 (1991)(defending the idea that a group purpose or intent 
can be ascribed to group action by giving common-sense examples from everyday life 
where society does ascribe a group intent, despite the possibility of slightly varying 
motives for each individual in the group making the decision). · 
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which they made these assumptions.156 I will not indulge in philosophical 
debate as to whether collective intent exists; I am assuming for the purposes of 
this paper that it exists and can be found. One practical reason to do so is that 
the Ohio Revised Code allows courts to look for legislative intent when the 
language of a statute is ambiguous.157 
V. A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND OHIO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. What is Legislative History? 
Even those involved in Ohio legislative process might say that Ohio has no 
legislative history, because they define legislative history as what Congress 
creates, i.e., a verbatim record carefully indexed and kept in volumes in law 
libraries everywhere. Many observers seem to think that if a state keeps a record 
similar to that of Congress, it has legislative history, and if it does not, it simply 
has no legislative history. I want to sift through the actual ingredients of 
legislative history at the federal level; look at precisely which ingredients courts 
rely upon and why; then look again at Ohio legislative history and compare. 
At its simplest, legislative history is the circumstances of the creation of the 
statute)SS A more narrow definition is the institutional progress of a bill to 
enactment. At its most detailed, it is a complete record of every word of debate 
and testimony ever spoken or written about a bill.l59 
Courts value legislative history for the insight it provides about the intent of 
the legislators, or the mischief at which the text is aimed)60 This is particularly 
so when the language of the statute is ambiguous or incomplete, although 
courts also use legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of the text.161 
Congress produces a vast quantity of legislative history, but not all of it is con-
l56See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing how legislative history 
can also help those who prefer the "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation. 
Judge Easterbrook distinguishes different uses of legislative history and comments that 
"[t]o decode words one must frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture of the 
drafters. Legislative history rna y be invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment 
and the assumptions its authors entertained about how their words would be 
understood."). 
l57See OHIO REv. CODE ANN., supra note 26, § 1.49. 
158WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, ]R. & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 733 (1995). 
159See Orro HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 438 (2d ed. 1993) (cited in 
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 158, at 733 n.l (providing a checklist of all the materials 
that will constitute the legislative history of a law; number 11 of the list is analysis of 
bill by legislative counsel). 
160See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 51, at 356 (The most authoritative historical 
evidence is the legislative history of the statute, because it is a contemporary record 
made by the enacting legislators). 
161See Brudney, supra note 155, at 42-43 & n.l72. 
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sidered equally reliable for this purpose.162 There are problems of 
manipulation, and there is skepticism that collective intent can ever be 
determined.163 When federal courts do rely on legislative history, their first 
choice for an authoritative source is usually the committee report. Committee 
reports are accessible, describe the problems the proposed legislation is meant 
to resolve and the solutions offered by the bill, and contain a "section by section 
summary of the provisions of the bill."164 
Another reason courts use committee reports as legislative history is because 
the committee report is relied upon by those not on the committee to tell them 
what the purpose of the bill is and what the bill will accomplish. The other 
members will trust the committee report's contents because they trust its 
authors.l65 When a court is interpreting a federal statute it is trying to 
determine what Congress intended, and if the text does not provide the answer, 
it seeks evidence of what Congress intended in a document relied upon by 
those who voted on the bill. The committee report is the relied-upon 
document.166 Thus it is considered to be the most reliable form of legislative 
history, because it represents a shared understanding reached by Congress as 
a body.167 
There are many other forms of federal legislative history: floor debates, 
hearings, statements by sponsors or drafters, post-enactment legislative 
history, and legislative inaction.l68 But reliability diminishes as possibilities for 
manipulation increase. Further, some federal judges do not consider any 
legislative history reliable because they do not believe in the concept of 
"collective intent" and are concerned about manipulation of records of 
history.l69 
162See id. at 47-48, 56, 75-76. Legislative history is not voted upon, much of it is 
produced by staff who are not elected, and members may at times insert statements in 
the record for the purpose of swaying a court. This does not means that legislative 
history should be disregarded, but it does suggest that reliability of types of history in 
general, and "key elements" of particular pieces of any history, need to be evaluated. 
163See id. at 5. See also Breyer, supra note 155, at 863-66 for a defense of belief in group 
intent as a reasonable concept. 
164See EsKRJrx;E & FRICKEY, supra note 158, at 743. The authors recognize that in state 
legislatures, committee reports take on different forms, one of which is a staff analysis 
of a pending bill. Id. at 744. 
165See Brudney, supra note 155, at 74-75 & n.298. 
166See id. 
167See id. at 27-29 (describing how members of Congress use committee reports); 
("reliability attaches mainly because the history is a product of legislative mechanisms 
that the generality of members of embraced"). I d. at 70. 
168See generally EsKRirx;E & FRICKEY, supra note 158, at 733-832. 
169 Id. at 749. See also Brudney, supra note 155, at 48-49. 
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Actual committee minutes or reports in Ohio are not uniform in content, 
style, production, or use.l70 Bill analyses are fairly uniform, however, and I 
have shown that members of the Ohio General Assembly rely on bill analyses 
for an accurate neutral explanation of what the bill will accomplish.l71 If a 
committee report is the single most important item of federal legislative history, 
then it is interesting to compare its elements with the elements of the LSC bill 
analysis.172 
A committee report may contain "a description of the bill's purpose and 
scope, a statement of the reasons it should be enacted, a section-by-section 
analysis, a report on changes the bill would make in existing law, committee 
amendments, communications for the executive branch, if any, minority 
reports if any, and various other items."173 
An LSC bill analysis will describe the historical, social or legal background 
that gave rise to the bill, the scope of the changes it will make in existing law 
and the likely effect of those changes, and contain a section by section analysis. 
The bill analysis will not take an advocacy position as to why the bill should 
be enacted.174 It will instead describe the effect of the bill and reasons for 
enacting the bill. If the text as drafted does not accomplish the specific detailed 
purpose the sponsor had in mind, the analysis by its very nature will inform 
the sponsor, and the sponsor can amend the bill so that it is more likely to 
170See PUTNAM & ScHAEFGEN, supra note 146, at 91. "Unlike federal legislative history, 
hearings, testimony, debate and committee reports are not typically available .... " Id. 
See also Interview with Debbie Tavenner, supra note 38 (reporting that records of 
testimony are randomly, rather than consistently, available). 
171See Report to the Director, supra note 152. 
172The context of the bill drafting process in Ohio is text-centered, as I have described 
in part IV-C, LSC Staff Today, infra. Thus, legislative history is not expected to fill in 
gaps or answer questions left unanswered because of careless drafting. The differences 
in the content and quantity of legislative history in Ohio and Washington exist because 
of the differences in context-less legislative history is needed. Professional drafters are 
employed in order to avoid as much as possible the problems caused by careless drafting 
errors. Nevertheless, bill analyses contain remarkable similarities to committee reports. 
What is missing from bill analysis, compared to committee reports, may not be needed 
in Ohio. For example, elaborate purpose statements are not employed in Ohio on a 
regular basis; purpose is to be inferred from the operative provisions. See LSC BILL 
DRAFTING MANUAL IV -11 (1993 ). Executive agencies employ legislative liaisons to attend 
committee, and agency rules come back to LSC for code revision before they are codified 
into rules. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 103-06. 
173See CHRISTINA L. KUNZ ET. AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 282 (1992). 
174See LSC STAFF MANUAL, supra note 145, at 1 (reminding staff that the General 
Assembly wanted to make accurate and objective information available to members 
through the bill analysis) and 13 (describing when section-by-section analyses are 
useful, such as for longer bills, but cautioning that this technique alone will not provide 
an explanation of the bill). See also Telephone Interview with Dennis Papp, LSC Research 
Attorney (May 11, 1998) (distinguishing an analysis of all the sections of a bill from a 
section-by-section analysis). 
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accomplish the intended purpose.175 If the bill intends to change the law in 
response to a judicial decision, the bill analysis will say so.l76 
Each bill analysis for subsequent versions of a bill will describe changes in 
the bill and the effects of those changes on the bill and on existing law. The 
comparative synopsis, a format that compares amendments or substitute bills, 
also highlights and compares the effect of each proposed change.177 A 
comparison of the versions of bills and their analyses will provide insight into 
what happened at each stage of the legislative process. The final bill analysis 
of the enacted bill will explain the effect of any floor amendments added in the 
second chamber or in conference committee.178 
Thus, bill analyses contain many of the valuable ingredients found in federal 
committee reports, such as information about the bill's purpose and scope, a 
section-by-section analysis, the changes it will make in existing law, and 
amendments to the bill as introduced. Moreover, bill analyses lack some of the 
liabilities of federal legislative history. They are written by non-partisan 
drafters, they are based on the text alone, and they are not subject to the 
manipulation of political forces. Although a bill analysis will not describe a 
purpose that is at odds with a poorly drafted text, it will accent and emphasize 
the intent of text to change the law, or aid in construing intent of text that is 
ambiguous despite careful drafting. There is less legislative history in Ohio, but 
what there is, is "choice."179 Ohio courts during the past 18 years have 
increasingly used these bill analyses, either to assure themselves that they have 
understood the intent of the legislature when interpreting a new statute, or to 
understand an ambiguous statute.lSO 
175Typically, the purpose will have been established through a dialogue between 
legislator and LSC staff prior to and during bill drafting. 
176See,e.g., bill analysis forS.R. 98,122ndGen. Assembly(Ohio 1997), which explained 
that the bill provided that a court could not dismiss criminal charges when the only 
reason for dismissal was the request of the complaining witness and the prosecutor 
objected to the dismissal (emphasis added). This was a change in the law in reaction to 
the Ohio Supreme Court. 
177See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 56. 
17BSee id. at 57. The inclusion of floor amendments in the final analysis could be 
compared, in legislative history value, to the record of colloquies in Congress. 
179 As a point of comparison, I am inspired by Spencer Tracy's remarks in the movie 
PAT AND MIKE (Metro Goldwyn-Mayer 1952) about Katherine Hepburn's slight figure 
compared to her athletic ability. Mike said "she may not have much meat on her but 
what she has is cherce (sic)." Id. Ohio does not have the quantity of legislative history 
that Congress produces, but what Ohio does have is useful, reliable, and efficiently 
produced. Mike admired Pat's figure, and I admire what Ohio has managed to do with 
its leaner resources. 
lBDSee infra Part III. 
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Ultimately it is the legislature and the courts that decide what legislative 
history is and which kind is reliable,l81 Ohio emphasizes textual accuracy in 
its approach to drafting in a number of ways. Those who work for LSC believe 
that with careful attention to detail and to the wishes of the legislator, accurate 
text is achievable.182 Although LSC staff are not the only ones who draft, 
because some legislators do their own drafting, the technical services staff will 
still review their text for technical elements,l83 LSC staff provide bill analyses 
for the legislators as a method of checking if the text accomplishes its purpose; 
if it does not, amendments are likely to follow. These bill analyses are available 
for the entire General Assembly and their staff to read.184 This approach may 
actually work well enough that problems of interpretation do not come up as 
frequently as they do with federal law. By contrast, drafting in Congress is more 
fractured and corrections in process are difficult.185 
But interpretive problems still do arise in Ohio, even if infrequently, and 
section 1.49 of the Ohio Revised Code allows the courts to use extrinsic sources 
in those instances. In Ohio, commentators and some lawyers have been slow 
to notice this. In the next part, I will speculate about possible reasons. If 
attorneys are not aware of what is available, is it because the evidence is hidden, 
or is it because many attorneys are concrete thinkers and conceive of "legislative 
history" as "federal legislative history" only? 
B. Political Culture, Legislative Process, and Legislative History 
Washington, D.C., and Columbus, Ohio, are culturally different. If these two 
cities also have different political cultures with different political habits and 
personality, style and values, the Ohio legislature and legislative process 
should not be a carbon copy of Congress. The differences in political history, 
habits and traditions, which reflect the values of the state's residents, have an 
impact on the types of institutions a state adopts,l86 
lBlCf, Shirley S. Abrahamson and Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for 
Legislators and judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1045, 1049 (1991) (The 
authors make an assumption that "state judges and state legislators appear to influence 
each other in the common enterprise of interpreting, applying and improving statutes," 
before they analyze how judges interact with legislators through opinions, and how 
legislators then communicate with courts). Id. at 1050. 
182J base this observation on my interviews and interactions with LSC staff. This belief 
seems implicit, as well, in the length and detail of the instructions in the LSC BILL 
DRAFTING MANUAL, the procedures of the code revision staff, and the proofreading by 
the bill preparation staff, as described in the GUIDEBOOK at pp. 91-92. 
l83See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 91. 
l84See supra Part IV, B. 
l85See, e.g., EsKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 158, at 757-58. 
186ALAN ROSENTifAL, LEGISLATIVE LIFE: PEOPLE, PROCESS AND PERFORMANCE IN TifE 
STATES 111 (1981) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE LIFE]. "Legislatures are interwoven in the 
fabric of their states; and the legislative process cannot be considered in isolation from 
the prevailing ethos, the political ethics, and the capital community of the state in which 
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"Political culture" describes "the political habits built up by a group of people 
and transmitted from one generation to another;" it is the "personality 
structure" of the state.187 This concept can be useful even though there is no 
single standard about how to measure or classify the culture.188 The concept 
of political culture "sensitizes us to the distinctive and persistent qualities of 
each state-its styles of politics, the orientation of its citizens, and the 
heterogeneity within the state itself." Each state is assumed to have a unique 
political culture.l89 
What exactly is different about political culture in Ohio? Ohio is 
fundamentally conservative.190 It is a diverse state, geographically, ethnically, 
and economically, but its diversity has complex effects and seems to lead to 
resistance to change. Ohio voters are particularly conservative, as evidenced 
by patterns of gubernatorial elections throughout Ohio history. The state's 
history of choosing governors follows a pattern of electing candidates who 
promise to trim the budget, alternating with periodic but short terms by 
candidates who try to raise taxes and restore state services, who are then ousted 
from office by another candidate promising to trim spending. Ohio remains 
low in support for funding of state services.191 
Ohio's policy choices are cautious because even though the political parties 
are strong, they are nearly equal in numbers and power, so that state-wide 
solutions must be a compromise between competing partisan groups. The large 
number of cities in Ohio makes it difficult for one city to dominate the state; 
without one dominant party or city or region, leaders must seek compromise 
it operates." Id. 
187Jd. at 112. 
188DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 93-126 (2d ed. 
1984), cited in LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 186, at 113-14, n.3. Elazar uses a formulation 
to measure state political cultures. Elazar measures state culture on the basis of citizen 
orientation as individualistic, moralistic and traditionalistic. Ohio has an individualistic 
culture, which means that government's role is limited and politics is for the 
professionals. See id. 
189LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 186, at 112 (comparing the states in style, attitudes 
towards political participation and the role of government, using Daniel Elazar's 
formulation of state political cultures). 
190JoHN H. FENTON, MIDWEST POLmCS 153 (1966), cited in ALAN ROSENTHAL, STAFFING 
THE OHIO LEGISLATURE 2 (1972) and John J. Gargan & Alexander P. Lamis, Bibliographical 
Essay, in OHIO PoLmcs380 (Alexander P. Lamis ed., 1994). Fenton described "persistent 
conservative cultural patterns" in Ohio and was the first to describe Ohio politics as 
"issueless." Fenton found "a legacy of potent historical events mixed with persistent 
conservative cultural patterns reinforced by pervasive lack of information salient to the 
working man or woman." Gargan & Lamis, supra. Rosenthal quoted Fenton, describing 
Ohio, as dedicated to the "virtues of honesty, thrift, steadiness, and caution" and 
observed that this dedication continues, which makes radical change to existing patterns 
quite difficult. ROSENTHAL, supra. 
191See generally George W. Knepper, Ohio Politics: A Historical Perspective, in OHIO 
POLITICS, supra note 190, at 10-11, 15. 
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solutions. Candidates seeking statewide office must water down ideology to 
appeal to both ends of the political spectrum. Even though partisan 
identification by legislators and voters is strong in Ohio, it tends to be issueless 
and detached from consistent policy differences,l92 The compromises tend to 
result in conservative choices. One choice that has been persistently popular in 
Ohio history is cutting taxes.193 This leads those in elected office to believe that 
economy and frugality is very important to voters. 
How do these characteristics of political culture affect the Ohio legislative 
process? An exhaustive list is beyond the scope of this paper, but staffing in 
Ohio is a pertinent example ,194 Non-partisan staff is less costly to maintain than 
partisan staff because, as common sense dictates, you don't need two of every 
type of staff person, and therefore can function with a smaller legislative 
staff,l95 Non-partisan staff produce a different type of report as legislative 
history: neutral. If the neutral reports are accepted as accurate by both parties, 
a smaller quantity of reports will be necessary.196 In addition, the Ohio 
192See id. See also Patterson, supra note 113; ROSENTHAL, supra note 190. 
193See generally Knepper, supra note 191. 
194See, e.g., Alan P. Balutis, Legislative Staffing: A View from the States, in LEGISLATIVE 
STAFFING: A CoMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 106 Games J. Heaphey & Alan P. Balutis eds., 
1975) ("[S]taffing as a factor in the process of legislation has been, until fairly recently, 
almost completely ignored by political scientists ... to the extent that professional staff 
has been a subject of study, the utility of this research for students of legislatures has 
been limited by a major perceptual bias .... [l]egislative scholars have seemed to believe 
that Congress, and Congress alone, is worthy of study."); ROSENTHAL, supra note 190, at 
2 ("The development of professional staffing in Ohio must be rooted in this state's 
experience and this legislature's structure"); Susan Webb Hammond, Legislative Staffs, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Gerhard Loewenberg, et al. eds., 1985) 
(explaining the history, development and importance of research on legislative staffing 
in general). 
195See ROSENTHAL, supra note 190, at 2 (observing that the Ohio legislators he 
interviewed "expressed a devotion to economy and a concern about wastefulness and 
abuse. Legislators demand no more professional staff than is absolutely necessary to 
help them accomplish their job." See also JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 64 (observing that 
Ohio has a "thrift ethic." "When a significant service can be provided at relatively low 
cost its legislators will buy it. The alternative method of staffing with each house having 
its own research, committee, and in some instances, bill drafting staffs, is inherently 
inefficient.") 
196Compare Balutis, supra note 194, at 13 (describing a hypotheses that different kinds 
of staff have different effects, although the evidence is "sketchy and impresionistic," and 
it is possible that different kinds of arrangements may affect the balance of powers in 
the legislatures) and JOHNSTON, supra note 108, at 64-65 (suggesting that LSC works in 
Ohio because "the members of the Commission are the legislative leaders. They control 
it ... it makes them feel more at ease with having a non-partisan staff. The LSC does not 
represent an alternate source of power nor will it try to be one .... and ... it keeps their 
members satisfied. Without it leaders would face a variety of demands for staff services, 
especially for committee staff but also for additional aides to individual members. The 
present system is one in which a high degree of continuity is maintained and leaders 
do not have to contend with committee chairmen over how much staff support they can 
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legislature has not seen fit to transcribe its every word,197 perhaps because 
legislative history costs money to store and preserve.l98 
The rules for public record keeping in Ohio also reflect Ohio frugality. Public 
record keeping in Ohio is governed by section 149.333 of the Ohio Revised 
Code, which requires only that state agencies submit a plan for retention 
and/ or destruction of records to a state records administrator for approval.199 
Decisions about record keeping are ultimately made for LSC, like all other state 
agencies, by a state records administrator and a state auditor.200 Fiscal 
considerations play a role in their decision; an example of a fiscal consideration 
is the expense of using available space for records. LSC is forced to make 
record-keeping decisions based on the space made available to it by the state, 
and the state auditor approves the plan.201 The General Assembly has not 
legislated any different plan for LSC records. The state does not seem to want 
to use inordinate amounts of space and money to retain records. 
In contrast, there are a number of reasons why the use of partisan staff can 
cause an increase in total number of staff. If one house has its own staff, the 
other house will want its own staff, and the total staff size will double. If one 
party has its own staff, the other party will also need complementary staff of 
its own, and staff size will be doubled. Partisan staff inevitably means either 
larger numbers of staff or resentment by the house or party without the 
numbers. As staff size increases, staff members create a power structure of their 
own and can even create distance between the legislators and constituents and 
lobbyists. As staff size increases, eventually the work increases as well, for the 
have and who their staff should be"). 
197House and Senate sessions have been videotaped by a small cable company since 
the statehouse restoration. There is no plan yet for cataloging or transcribing the tapes. 
Interview with Renee Jensen, Operations Manager of Ohio Government 
Telecommunications, in Columbus, Ohio Ouly 29, 1997). 
l98See generally, National Archives Running Out of Room, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, 
Mar. 25, 1998, at A02, available in 1998 WL3762866 (describing how the National Archives 
is running out of storage space, necessitating a new facility that may also run out of 
space. The Archives head, John Carlin, is seeking $230 million for the fiscal year, an 
increase of 12% over this year. 
1990mo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.333 (Anderson 1990). "No state agency shall retain, 
destroy, or otherwise transfer its state records in violation of this section ... Each state 
agency shall submit to the state records administrator all applications for records 
disposal or transfer and all schedules of records retention and destruction. The state 
records administrator shall review such applications and schedules and provide written 
approval, rejection, or modification of the application or schedule .... " The decision of 
this administrator to approve or reject the plan will be "based upon the continuing 
administrative and fiscal value of the state records to the state or to its citizens ... " 
(emphasis added). 
200Interview with Debbie Tavenner, supra note 38. 
201Jd. 
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legislator and the staff. Staff become entrepreneurial with agendas of its own, 
seeking new innovative ideas that lead to more work for more staff.202 
Partisan staff is a choice and is not necessarily inevitable; once the choice is 
made, it is difficult to turn back. A perspective informed only by Congressional 
experience might assume that either non-partisan staff is impossible or that 
partisan staff is preferable because that is how things are done in Washington. 
Even Washington once tried to maintain a non-partisan staff, and certain 
committees continued to rely on non-partisan staff through the 1970s.203 Ohio 
demonstrates that non-partisan and partisan staff can work together in the 
legislative process because each meets different needs.204 States save money by 
using non-partisan staff for information and technical support, and saving 
money has historically been important to Ohio voters. 
The partisan but issueless attitude that often characterizes Ohio legislators 
may be another reason non-partisan staff is accepted here. Researchers have 
found in both recent and in earlier studies of legislators an odd mix of strong 
party identification without ideology or issue-orientation.205 Perhaps because 
particular issues are not charged with party identity it is easier for Ohio 
legislators to turn to neutral researchers for objective facts when drafting bills. 
After the facts are available, the political decisions are made. The fact-finding 
process itself may not be political because the issues are not perceived as 
political. 
There is a "Washington bias" in research and commentary on state 
legislatures.206 Because each of the fifty states has a different political culture, 
generalities about political process in "the states" are unwise. I have discussed 
staffing differences; the states are different from each other in many other ways 
which I will not explore in depth. For example, some have part-time "citizen" 
legislatures who serve without pay and some have full-time "professional" 
legislatures. The Ohio General Assembly is now considered full-time, but many 
members have second full-time careers, so that even the word "full-time" does 
not mean the same in every state.207 Also, a number of states have term limits, 
including Ohio, while many others do not. With respect for the staff support 
for these legislators, some states have one central agency, others have multiple 
202See MALBIN, supra note 141, at 163-65, 248-49 (describing these occurrences in 
Congress). 
203Jd. (briefly describing non-partisan staff in Congress). See generally HARRISON W. 
FOX, ]R. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS 22 (1977) (discussing the 
history of the development of staff in congress from 1885 to 1976). 
204See supra Part IV-C. 
205See Patterson, supra note 113, at 251. 
206Balutis, supra note 194, at 106, n.l. Phrase coined by Alan Rosenthal. 
207See Patterson, supra note 113, at 239 ("[F]or most members being a state legislator 
is a vocation. Two thirds ... in 1988 indicated they were full time legislators. At the same 
time two thirds of the House members and three fourths of the senators reported 
pursuing a second occupation as well"). 
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decentralized agencies; some central agencies are part of the legislative process 
and even involved in making policy, others are very removed from the 
process.208 
Despite each state's unique political culture, commentators feel free to judge 
the content, style and method, and quality of Ohio's legislative process and 
record keeping by a Washington standard: if they are not the same, then Ohio's 
must be inferior; or in the case of legislative history, non-existent. Even political 
and government insiders in Ohio, including LSC staff and lobbyists, will say 
there is no legislative history in Ohio, because the accepted definition of 
legislative history, even for the insiders, is that which is maintained by 
Congress. If other key aspects of political culture in Columbus differ from 
Washington, should we expect the legislative history to be the same? 
State organizations reflect and serve the culture of their own state and 
political community.209 Yet, those within the states do not always appreciate 
the utility of their uniqueness; instead they look to Washington as a measuring 
stick to evaluate and describe themselves. I believe this is precisely what is 
going on in Ohio when lawyers say "there is no legislative history in Ohio." I 
believe they only mean that Ohio does not have the type or quantity of 
legislative history as Congress. Meanwhile, for seventeen years Ohio courts 
have recognized LSC documents as helpful in determining legislative intent. 
VI. ACCESS AND AWARENESS 
Forty years ago, some judges did not consider federal legislative history to 
be sufficiently accessible to lawyers and the general public for the Supreme 
Court in fairness to use it in their decisions.210 Today, access to federal 
legislative history is not considered to be a problem.211 Is access to Ohio 
legislative history a problem? 
Many researchers attempt to approach state legislative history using federal 
legislative history as their conceptual framework. Using the federal conceptual 
208See generally Brian Weberg, Changes in Legislative Staff, in THE JOURNAL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENT 190 (1989) (describing other staffing differentials such as degree of 
centralization v. decentralization, degree of specialization, and degree of influence on 
policy-making). 
209See JoHNSTON, supra note 108, at 65 (describing institutional conservatism in the 
Ohio legislature: "If it works, why fix it? is an Ohio attitude."). 
210See United States v. Public Util. Comm'n ofCa.,345 U.S. 295,319-21 (1953) Oackson, 
J., concurring) (Justice Jackson was concerned that some of the attorneys involved could 
not view the legislative history that the majority relied upon until only a short time 
before arguments). 
211See Brudney, supra note 155, at 59, n.239, citing HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, 
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 1278-83 
(lOth ed. 1958) (noting that even then, there were "three or more depository libraries for 
U.S. government documents in every state and ... the Congressional Record and 
committee reports are routinely collected in these libraries"). Today, Westlaw and LEXIS 
make committee reports available to those who can purchase the service. 
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framework may be an obstacle in the search for and recognition of Ohio 
legislative history. The formats and quantity are different. Federal legislative 
history seems more elegant, and the verbatim records allow the researcher the 
luxury of finding a complete picture of the process of enactment of a bill. 
Ohio legislative history in contrast is minimalist. The researcher will have to 
resort to microfilm to recover many "hard copy" documents212 and microfilm 
research can be tedious. Yet, Ohio legislative history seems to be available at 
the same or similar locations as federal legislative history. Both are available 
from on-line services.213 Both are preserved partially on microfilm. Both are 
available at many of the same libraries.214 The vast quantity of federal history 
in general does not guarantee that one will always find Congress's intent any 
more than the scarcer quantity of Ohio history guarantees that one will not. 
If it is commonly said that there is no legislative history in Ohio, and yet 
meanwhile, Ohio courts are recognizing LSC bill analyses as legislative history, 
some attorneys must be using these documents as part of their arguments. 
Obviously, they know what it is and where to find it. Do they have a connection 
to government, the legislature, or a lobbying group? Are they all based in 
Columbus, or do they come from all over the state? Are they privileged in any 
way? Access was not a problem for them, so it might be interesting to find out 
more about their identities. 
An exhaustive study of the identities of these attorneys is beyond the scope 
of this paper but a brief empirical sample may be enlightening. I examined the 
records of ten recent cases decided by the Ohio Supreme Court that cite LSC 
bill analyses as legislative history to determine if any pattern was obvious from 
the briefs.215 
This sample is small and unscientific, more impressive for its variety than 
for any clear patterns. Prosecutors, defense attorneys, city attorneys, and 
attorneys in private practice from both large and small firms used LSC bill 
analyses. The cases in which the LSC bill analyses were visible in the briefs 
originated in urban areas in Ohio. Rural attorneys were not represented; rural 
clients had urban firms representing them. Eight of the cases came from 
counties with large cities or from suburban areas near large cities and two came 
from rural counties. The two cases originating in rural counties had client 
212See supra text accompanying note 38. 
213See generally PuTNAM & ScHAEFGEN, supra note 146, at 247-74 (listing and evaluating 
computer sites available in Ohio for legal research). 
214See supra text accompanying note 38. 
215J began with ten recent Ohio Supreme Court cases. Most, if not all, pre-1997 cases 
are also excerpted in William Heaphy's memo. Using the docket numbers, I asked the 
librarian at the Supreme Court library for the file containing the briefs for each case. 
Then I proceeded to look for who was citing the LSC analysis. In most of the briefs, the 
analysis was listed in the table of authorities of the brief or in the appendix to the brief. 
In four cases, I could not find a citation to LSC, even by reading the briefs, but the court 
mentioned LSC bill analyses in its decision anyway. In at least one of these, the statute 
at issue, but not the LSC analysis, was discussed in the briefs. 
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representation by lawyers based in urban law firms. In one rural case, it appears 
that the court made use of a LSC bill analysis even though it did not appear in 
the briefs. Based on this small unscientific sample, it appears that attorneys 
from urban areas in Ohio might use LSC bill analyses more often than rural 
attorneys. 
In seven cases, the briefs contained mention of LSC documents. In two of 
these seven cases, both sides used LSC bill analyses in their arguments. In five 
cases, only one side used LSC bill analyses in their arguments. The attorneys 
on each side carne from a variety of settings and included large firms, small 
firms, and government. Seven of the cases were criminal in nature and four 
were civil. No single judge wrote significantly more of the opinions than 
another. 
Three cases did not have any record of LSC documents in the briefs. Two of 
these opinions were written by Justice Resnick. In Felton v. Felton, Southeastern 
Ohio Legal Services represented appellant, with amici curiae briefs by 
attorneys representing Ohio National Organization for Women, Ohio NOW 
Education and Legal Fund, Action Ohio, Ohio Domestic Violence Network, 
and National Center on Women and Family Law.216 Appellee was not 
represented. In the later Resnick case, State v. Williams, appellant was 
represented by the City Solicitor and City Prosecutor from Cincinnati. The third 
case was a dispute between two state agencies, Office of Consumers Counsel v. 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, and was written per curiarn.217 The attorneys 
for appellant OCC were OCC staff attorneys; the attorneys for appellee PUCO 
included assistant attorneys general and an attorney in private practice 
represented McClure Telephone Company. 
Of the remaining seven cases, the citations to LSC bill analyses were 
relatively easy to find in the Table of Authorities or in the Appendix of the briefs, 
either cited directly or through an earlier case that cited LSC analysis of a 
pertinent statute. 
In State v. Awkal, appellee was represented by assistant prosecuting attorneys 
from Cuyahoga County; appellant was represented by McGinty, Gibbons & 
216Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672,674 (Ohio 1997); State v. Williams,683 N.E.2d 1126 
(Ohio 1997). The issues were related to new statutes intended to criminalize domestic 
violence and specifically to authorize courts to issue protection orders. Williams cites 
the court's use of LSC bill analysis in Felton to confirm the intent of the General 
Assembly to criminalize the activities and authorize ex parse protection orders. The 
briefs addressed the statutes but not the LSC bill analyses. Williams, 683 N.E.2d at 1128. 
2170ffice of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 638 N.E.2d 550,552 (Ohio 
1994). At issue was whether the legislature intended to "dispense with the notice and 
hearing requirements in the ratemaking process for small telephone companies," in 
contrast to the traditional ratemaking process where ratepayers and the ace do 
participate. rd. The LSC bill analysis confirms the legislative intent to not require notice 
or hearing. The briefs addressed the statutes but not the LSC bill analysis. 
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Hilow Co., L.P.A.218 The prosecutors cited an earlier case that quoted an LSC 
Comment in a bill analysis. The opinion was written by Justice Pfeifer. 
In State v. Economo, appellant was represented by Cuyahoga County assistant 
prosecuting attorneys; appellee by Arthur P. Lambros and Thomas Paris of 
Cleveland.219 Both sides used the same LSC bill analysis comment in their 
briefs. The opinion was written by Justice Cook. 
In State v. Moaning, appellant was represented by Montgomery County 
prosecuting attorneys; appellee by Daniel E. Brinkman. A brief by counsel for 
appellee was not in the file given to me by the Supreme Court librarian. The 
prosecuting attorneys quoted LSC. The opinion was written by Justice 
Stratton.220 
In State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, relators seeking a writ of mandamus 
were represented by Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Rishel, Myers & 
Kopech, Esther S. Weissman Co., L.P.A. and amicus curiae by the Ohio 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. Respondents were represented by the Attorney 
General, the State Solicitor, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, and amici curiae 
by Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease. The dissenting opinion by Justice Sweeney 
mentioned the LSC bill analysis.221 Attorneys from Stewart Jaffy & Associates 
used a twenty-page LSC bill analysis to illustrate the number of changes made 
to existing law. 
218Statev.Awkal,667N.E.2d 960,966 (Ohio 19%). The issue was the evidence of prior 
calculation and design to commit a crime. The prosecution used a LSC bill analysis 
Comment, cited in State v. Cotton, 381 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ohio 1978), to emphasize that 
length of time did not determine whether an accused acted with prior calculation and 
design. Awkal, 667 N.E.2d at 967. 
219State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225,227 (Ohio 19%). At issue was the corroboration 
requirement for the crime of sexual imposition. The state wanted to abolish the 
requirement and emphasized that the intent of the legislation was unwise. The 
defendant emphasized that the LSC Comment stated the corroboration rule is justified 
because of the "ease with which this crime may be abused in prosecution." Id. at 229. 
220State v. Moaning, 666 N.E.2d 1115-16 (Ohio 1996). At issue was whether the 
legislature intended to prohibit a person who had been convicted of attempted drug 
abuse from carrying a firearm under OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 2923.13(A)(3) which 
prohibits having a weapon while under disability. The court used the LSC comment to 
support its interpretation of the language of the statute, and as an "indication of the 
legislature's intent to broaden the scope of the disability statute." I d. at 1116. 
221State ex ref. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 585 (Ohio 1994). Two of 
the four issues presented were whether the substantive changes in the workers 
compensation system as part of a workers compensation appropriations bill violated 1) 
the three-consideration provision and 2) the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. 
The dissent argued that "what started as a simple appropriations bill, now contained 
massive substantive law changes to the workers' compensation system," and said the 
"magnitude of the changes ... is demonstrated by the LSC Comparison of Current and 
Prior Workers' Compensation Law ... [i]t takes twenty pages to list the changes made 
by the bill." These facts were part of the dissent's argument that "what occurred here is 
a classic example of the 'logrolling' forbidden by the one-subject rule .... " Id. at 601-02. 
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In State v. D'Ambrosio, a death penalty case, appellee was represented by 
prosecuting attorneys from Cuyahoga County and appellant was represented 
by John F. Norton and John H. Higgans. Attorneys for the appellant cited State 
v. Cotton, which quoted a LSC bill analysis.222 
In Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Systems, appellants were represented by the 
Attorney General with amicus curiae by Ross, Brittain & Schonberg Co. for 
Ohio ABC Inc., and appellee by Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease with amicus 
curiae by Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff for the Ohio State Building 
and Construction Trades Council. The concurring opinion written by Justice 
Douglas cited the LSC Summary.223 Amicus curiae for appellants cited Harris 
v. Van Hoose that used a LSC bill analysis to argue legislative intent. 
In In re Annexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis, appellees were 
represented by Schwartz, Manes & Ruby, a Cincinnati firm; the appellants by 
Sheldon A. Strand, and Leslie S. Landen, Middleton Law Directors. Both sides 
used LSC bill analyses in their briefs, but cited different house bills for different 
statutes. The opinion was written by Justice Holmes.224 
Slightly different results could be construed from a LEXIS search that 
included all Ohio courts and reported and unreported cases. These came from 
a much wider range of counties than found in this sample of ten.225 Of the lower 
222State v. D' Ambrosio,616 N.E.2d 909,912 (Ohio 1993). An issue was the appellant's 
prior calculation and design. The court quoted a LSC comment quoted in State v. Cotton, 
381 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ohio 1978) in its discussion of the requirements for prior calculation 
and design. Id. at 918. 
223Harris v. Atlas Single-Ply Sys., 593 N.E.2d 1376-77 (Ohio 1992). At issue was 
whether the language of the statute of limitations regarding unpaid minimum wages 
could be applied in an action by an employee for the payment of prevailing wages and 
thus require that the Department of Industrial Relations bring an action on behalf of 
employees within two years. The concurring opinion quoted a LSC summary cited in 
Harris v. Van Hoose, 550 N.E.2d 461,463 (Ohio 1990) and concluded that any limitation 
periods in the statute applied only when a prevailing wage law violation existed and 
so did not apply to this case. Id. at 1378. 
224Jn reAnnexation of 311.8434 Acres of Land v. Lewis, 597 N.E.2d 460, 461 (Ohio 
1992). At issue was whether township trustees could appeal the approval of a 
landowner's petition for annexation. Appellants used the bill analysis of H. B. 412, and 
appellees used the bill analysis for H.B. 175. The court used the LSC analysis of H.B. 175 
to find the purpose of the amendment to section 505.62 of the Ohio Revised Code and 
found that the amendment only conferred standing on township trustees to appeal 
denial of an annexation petition and was a response to the court's denial of that standing 
in In reAppeal of Bass Lake Community, Inc., 449 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio 1983), which did 
not change the procedure for allowance of a landowner's petition for annexation. 
Landowners were provided broader appeal rights under Chapter 2506 of the Ohio 
Revised Code. Appellants claimed there was a conflict between the procedures. The 
court of appeals had ruled that the legislature provided concurrent remedies. Lewis, 597 
N.E.2d at 462. 
2251 conducted a boolean search for all cases in all Ohio courts in which the phrase 
"Legislative Service C' occurred. This type of search will retrieve any case w:here ~SC 
is mentioned at all and yielded a total of 213 cases from 1958 through 1997, mcludmg 
54 Supreme Court cases, 93 appellate court cases, 56 unreported appellate court cases, 
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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court cases, urban counties were more heavily represented than rural counties, 
but rural counties still were represented. There were urban counties, suburban, 
and rural counties in the search results. Of the reported appellate cases, 
approximately 25% were from rural county districts, the remaining 75% from 
urban or suburban counties. Of the unreported appellate cases, slightly fewer 
than 20% came from rural county districts; the remaining 80% from urban or 
suburban counties. Of the ten miscellaneous cases, one-third came from rural 
counties.226 
To put this in context, one must remember that Ohio has few purely rural 
counties or appellate court districts; it has five major industrial cities, a state 
capital that is larger in population than any of the industrial cities, and 
numerous small industrial cities.227 It is arguable whether there are any truly 
remote rural areas in Ohio, except possibly southeastern Ohio. But the Fourth 
Appellate District was relatively well represented in the LEXIS search results 
with a total of fourteen appellate cases.228It is possible that rural attorneys do 
not have equal access to Ohio legislative history; they may have to rely on 
on-line services such as Hannah Information Systems for state legislative 
history (and LEXIS and Westlaw for federal legislative history) if they do not 
have time to drive one to three hours to Columbus and back for research. A 
and 10 miscellaneous court cases. 
226I classified collar counties surrounding urban counties as suburban rather than 
rural. I defined "rural" as not urban or suburban. Of ninety-three reported appellate 
court cases, twenty-two came from rural counties; of fifty-six unreported cases, nine 
came from rural counties; of ten miscellaneous cases, three came from rural counties. 
227Knepper, supra note 191, at 3 ("Ohio ... has an extraordinary number of industrial 
cities. Prior to World War II, it had more cities with over 100,000 population than did 
any state, and they were widely distributed across its area, with only the southeast 
quadrant lacking a major city. Twenty smaller cities, in the 25,000 to 85,000 population 
range, were also widely distributed"). 
228The LEXIS search yielded thirteen reported cases and one unreported case citing 
LSC from the Fourth Appellate District, which includes Pickaway, Ross, Highland, 
Adams, Pike, Scioto, Hocking, Vinton, Jackson, Lawrence, Gallia, Meigs, Athens, and 
Washington Counties. See PuTNAM & Sc:HAEFGEN, supra note 146, at 129 (Court of 
Appeals District Map). Of Ohio's twelve appellate districts, only four do not include a 
county that borders or contains a city. One, the Fifth District, consists of fifteen counties, 
and includes some collar counties of Columbus, and the smaller city of Mansfield, in 
addition to rural areas such as Holmes County. The Fifth District had a total of six 
appellate cases citing LSC. The Seventh District in central eastern Ohio had six cases 
citing LSC. The Third District, in northwestern Ohio, a predominantly agricultural area, 
between but not including the Dayton and Toledo areas, had only two cases. Other 
factors, such as the opinions of the judges and their clerks about Ohio legislative history, 
may affect the use of LSC analyses, because location and rural nature of a district do not 
consistently correlate to a demonstrated lack of access. This is very rough data and I 
relied on my general knowledge of Ohio to determine which districts were rural and 
non-rural. 
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superficial look at these search results does not provide such a simplistic 
answer.229 
It would be useful at another time to look at all the briefs for all the cases in 
which LSC bill analyses are used, including counties that are not major urban 
area. The subject of access is ripe for further research because the preliminary 
data is inconclusive. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to come to conclusions about the reasons for the gap between 
the use of legislative history by Ohio courts, and its official acknowledgement 
in scholarly articles. Ohio's version of legislative history might filter into 
general awareness from the practicing attorney up to the scholarly writers 
rather than the other way around. The conservatism I described as part of 
Ohio's political culture may also influence lawyers's statements and 
observations about Ohio legislative history. 
We could be on the verge of an upward swing in awareness.230 A few things 
are different now. The commentaries that use LSC as evidence of legislative 
intent, even without an explicit recognition of the source as legislative history, 
have increased recently.231 A new Ohio Legal Research Guide will clarify for 
many where to find what is available in Ohio.232 Lawyers may be taking baby 
steps towards recognition of Ohio's unique sources. Moving slowly and 
cautiously towards change is not an unusual phenomenon in Ohio. 
I have answered some of the questions I raised in the introduction of this 
article. Commentators and attorneys have relied on a limited definition of 
legislative history; I have tried to persuade you to expand your definition. 
There is at least a lack of perceptiveness, if not a misunderstanding, about how 
the political culture of a state influences its institutions and their operations. I 
cannot find any solid evidence to suggest that some lawyers have inside 
information that others do not have equal access to, although that is a question 
that deserves more research. It should be apparent by now that many are 
ignoring what is both obvious and available, because of concrete thinking, or 
cultural ethnocentrism, or a federal bias, or because they equate quantity with 
229Cf, Knepper, supra note 191, at 12. Rural Ohio is well-represented in the General 
Assembly, from 1945 to the 1990's. "Ohio's major cities were also hampered by 
underrepresentation in the state legislature ... [T]he 'cornstalk brigade' was exerting a 
disproportionate influence on state spending." See also supra text accompanying note 
211. 
230There were six Supreme Court cases in 1997 citing LSC bill analysis, five in 1996, 
none in 1995, three in 1994, one in 1993, three in 1992, nine in 1991, four in 1990, two in 
1989, one in 1988, two in 1987, none in 1985, one in 1984, four in 1982, three in 1981, and 
five in 1980, including Meeks. 
231See supra text accompanying note 22. 
232PUTNAM & SCHAEFGEN, supra note 146. 
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quality.233 Are we merely in a time lag before the legal community comes to 
agreement? That remains to be seen. 
I have tried to put together the pieces of the political and legislative puzzle 
that is Ohio. Some pieces of the puzzle are still missing, particularly those that 
would fill in the gaps about access and awareness. One part of the picture is 
clear, though; there is legislative history in Ohio. 
233 Alternatively, because most law schools do not require students to take a 
Legislation course, many lawyers do not understand federal or state legislative process, 
or the various theories and methods of statutory interpretation, as well as they 
understand the common law. See generally Otto Hetzel, Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation: Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the Classroom and the Courtroom, 
48 U. Pm. L. REv. 663 (1987)(arguing that all law students need a course that teaches 
legislative process, explains the behavioral norms of legislative institutions, and 
analyzes theories of statutory interpretation). 
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